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WHAT DOES THE SECOND AMENDMENT MEAN TODAY?
MICHAEL C. DORF*
INTRODUCTION
A growing body of scholarship argues that the Second
Amendment protects a right of individuals to possess firearms,
regardless of whether those individuals are organized in state
militias.' Proponents of the individual right view2 do not merely
disagree with those who champion the competing view that the
Second Amendment poses few if any obstacles to most forms of gun
control legislation by the state or federal governments. Judged by the
titles of their writings, many of the individual right scholars appear to
believe that the Second Amendment has been subject to uniquely
shabby treatment by the courts and, until recently, academic
commentators. For example, Sanford Levinson titles an important
essay The Embarrassing Second Amendment,3 thereby suggesting that
any interpretation less robust than the one favored by the National
Rifle Association ("NRA") must be the product of result-oriented
scholarship. The Second Amendment, Levinson implies, protects an
individual right to own guns, and that is embarrassing to liberals (like
him) who favor gun control. In the same vein, Eugene Volokh titles a
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. An early draft
of this Article was presented at the N.Y.U. Law School Constitutional Colloquium in January
2000. In writing and revising the Article, I greatly benefited from the comments of Akhil Amar,
Barbara Black, Vincent Blasi, Carl Bogus, Sherry Colb, Christopher Eisgruber, Jeffrey Fagan,
Barry Friedman, Kent Greenawalt, Larry Kramer, Sanford Levinson, Henry Monaghan, Gerald
Neuman, Lawrence Sager, Robert Spitzer, Mark Tushnet, and Richard Uviller. I thank Sarah
Stafford for research assistance.
1. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 897 n.211 (3d
ed. 1999).
2. The individual right scholars sometimes refer to their position as the "standard model,"
thereby suggesting that other views are idiosyncratic. See Michael A. Bellesiles, Suicide Pact:
New Readings of the Second Amendment, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 247, 249 (1999) (criticizing
the use of such terminology in Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New
Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1141 (1996); Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995)). This
Article uses a somewhat more neutral terminology.
3. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
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recent essay The Amazing Vanishing Second Amendment.4 Volokh
argues that the interpretive moves that have been used to restrict the
Second Amendment's scope are unprincipled because they would be
unacceptable in other contexts.5  Similar claims permeate the
individual right literature.6
This Article argues that the Second Amendment has not been
unfairly orphaned. The courts and commentators that reject the
individual right scholars' claims are justified in doing so by the
application of the same criteria of interpretation commonly applied to
other constitutional provisions. A nonexclusive list of the relevant
factors includes: doctrine, text, original understanding, structural
inference, postadoption history, and normative considerations.7
Champions of the individual right interpretation of the Second
Amendment may believe that these criteria are wrongheaded or
illegitimate in all contexts. For example, many individual right
scholars appear to believe that original meaning is the sole criterion
of constitutional interpretation.8 But if that is their premise, they
cannot contend that nonoriginalist interpretation of the Second
Amendment is anything like a unique mistake. Many of the
foundational doctrines of our current constitutional regime do not
comport with the original understanding of the Constitution or its
amendments. The requirement of equal population apportionment
for state legislative districts, the invalidity of de jure racial
segregation, and the breadth of federal power under the Commerce
Clause (even after the recent federalism decisions) are all at odds
with the dominant understandings of those who adopted the relevant
constitutional provisions. Original understanding is not the sole, nor
4. Eugene Volokh, The Amazing Vanishing Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 831
(1998).
5. See id. at 840; Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 793,805-06 (1998).
6. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment As an
"Underenforced Constitutional Norm", 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 719 (1998); Dan Polsby,
Treating the Second Amendment Like Normal Constitutional Law, REASON, Mar. 1996, at 32.
7. My list overlaps substantially with those of other scholars. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 8-9 (1991); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189-90 (1987).
For sympathetic accounts of eclectic approaches to constitutional interpretation, see Michael C.
Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original
Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765 (1997); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1753 (1994); Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional
Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13, 35 (1990).
8. See, e.g., JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 176 (1994). One notable exception is L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words,
and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1311 (1997).
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even the principal, measure of a constitutional interpretation's
correctness.9 If the individual right interpretation of the Second
Amendment rests on contrary premises, its scholars must persuade us
to abandon much more than gun control.
This Article proceeds in six parts. Parts I through V parse the
criteria of constitutional interpretation identified above. For clarity
of presentation, I treat these factors one at a time, but they are of
course interrelated.10 In the end, a satisfying interpretation is not so
much one that earns the highest composite score on the relevant
factors, nor even one that prevails in a trumping category, but one
that best hangs together." Deciding which interpretation best hangs
together admittedly requires a somewhat subjective judgment, and
those who favor gun control as a policy matter are likely to be more
sympathetic to the interpretation I offer than are those who oppose it.
But under any plausible approach to legal interpretation, an
individual interpreter's policy views will have some positive
correlation with her interpretive views.12
It has become customary to contrast the individual right view of
the Second Amendment with what is often called the "collective
9. Although I would reject originalism on normative grounds, I mean the statement in the
text only as a descriptive claim. Even those who are committed to the original understanding on
legitimacy grounds must recognize the large role that nonoriginalist precedents play in our
constitutional order. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 727-39 (1988). As two of the other articles in this Symposium ably
demonstrate, the originalist arguments in favor of the individual right interpretation of the
Second Amendment exemplify the problems of originalism. See Daniel A. Farber, Disarmed by
Time: The Second Amendment and the Failure of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 167 (2000)
(emphasizing the dead-hand problem and the difficulty of discerning constitutional meaning
through the mists of time); Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of
Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103 (2000) (describing the thin evidence for many of the
historical claims of individual right scholars).
10. Original understanding and structural inference are so intertwined that I consider them
together.
11. Fallon makes the important point that constitutional interpreters strive to make various
forms of argument cohere with one another, see Fallon, supra note 7, at 1240-43, but errs when
he proposes a hierarchy for cases in which coherence cannot be achieved. See id. at 1243-46. In
my view, no all-purpose hierarchy can be justified or even located in existing practice. See Dorf,
supra note 7, at 1794; Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 593, 607-09 (1999).
12. Perhaps for this reason, individual right scholars count it as a victory when otherwise
"liberal" scholars such as Sanford Levinson or Laurence Tribe endorse the "conservative"
position. As Robert Spitzer notes in his contribution to this Symposium, however, that reaction
is a kind of inverse ad hominem argument; it looks to who makes the arguments rather than
what they argue. See Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment,
76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349 (2000). Moreover, it is hardly obvious that opposition to gun control
is a conservative position, given that liberals generally oppose limits on civil liberties. See GARY
KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 3-5 (1991).
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right" interpretation. 13 Under the latter, the Second Amendment
protects some right of state militias against undue federal interference
but no right of individuals against either federal or state regulation. 4
This Article is sympathetic to the collective right view but
acknowledges that the Second Amendment is and has always been
somewhat puzzling. Motivated in large measure by the founders'
distrust of standing armies, even on the broadest reading, the Second
Amendment does nothing to prevent the federal government from
maintaining a standing army. So too, the right of insurrection that is
sometimes offered as a normative justification for a right to possess
firearms has been emphatically rejected by our constitutional history.
When individuals attempted to exercise a right to rebel during the
Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, President Washington called forth the
militia (the institution at the heart of the Second Amendment) to
suppress the rebels. The only serious attempt by the states to exercise
a right of rebellion led to the Civil War.
The conclusion of Parts I through V, therefore, is that the Second
Amendment is probably best read to prevent the federal government
from abolishing state militias. Part VI considers the objection that
even if such a prohibition made sense in the eighteenth century, it
does not make sense today. There is a canon of statutory
construction requiring that every word of a statute be given some
effect 5 and an apparent parallel canon in constitutional law. 16 Thus,
the objection continues, in the modern world, the individual right
interpretation is necessary to give some operative content to the
Second Amendment. Part VI responds to this objection by denying
that there is anything especially anomalous about a doctrine that
renders a constitutional provision largely pointless in modern times.
For those readers who nonetheless are uncomfortable with a
superfluous constitutional provision, Part VI then suggests three
alternative interpretations of the Second Amendment, none of which
would stand as a barrier to effective gun control. Each approach has
13. See, e.g., Keith A. Erhman & Dennis A. Hennigan, The Second Amendment in the
Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 5, 57-58 (1989);
David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution: Conjuring with
the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 888-89 (1996).
14. See Daniel Abrams, Ending the Other Arms Race: An Argument for a Ban on Assault
Weapons, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 488, 504 (1992); Erhman & Hennigan, supra note 13, at 57.
15. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 276 (2d ed. 1997). For an
example, see Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 257-58 (1993).
16. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 342 (1816) ("[U]nless the
state courts could sustain jurisdiction in such cases, this clause of the sixth article would be
without meaning or effect ....").
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its difficulties, but then, as I argue throughout, that is likely to be true
of any interpretation of the puzzling Second Amendment.
I. DOCTRINE
The Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." Although eclectic
interpretive theories customarily list authoritative text as the first
consideration in ascertaining meaning,'7 I shall defer consideration of
the Second Amendment's text as such until Part II. I do so, not
simply because the Second Amendment lacks a "plain meaning," but
because, contrary to conventional wisdom, constitutional doctrine
typically trumps constitutional text-at least absent arguments of
sufficient strength to overcome the principle of stare decisis.18 For
example, there is a familiar and powerful textual argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on state deprivations of liberty
without due process implicitly authorizes such deprivations where
adequate procedures are followed. 19 Yet even the staunchest critics of
particular doctrines adopted in the name of "substantive due process"
would not so limit the clause; at a minimum, they accept that the
Fourteenth Amendment has the substantive effect of incorporating
most of the Bill of Rights against the states.20 An argument that, say,
the First Amendment poses no obstacle to a state imposing
viewpoint-based regulations on speech would face an insurmountable
doctrinal hurdle. Similarly, references in the case law to "the
dormant Commerce Clause"'" suggest that there is an express
provision of the Constitution restricting the states' ability to enact
17. See Fallon, supra note 7, at 1195-98.
18. See Monaghan, supra note 9, at 744 ("[S]tare decisis plays a very large role in
constitutional law."). For accounts of constitutional interpretation that give primacy to
doctrine, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Foreword: Implementing
The Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997); David Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
19. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 18 (1980) ("'[S]ubstantive due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green
pastel redness."'). For a useful account of the antebellum (and older) roots of what has come to
be called substantive due process, see James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth
and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 315 (1999).
20. Justice Scalia, for example, does not merely grudgingly accept the applicability of free
speech limits on the states; he has actively and enthusiastically extended them. See, e.g., R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (Scalia, J.) (invalidating a city ordinance that drew
content-based distinctions within the category of fighting words).
21. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575 (1997)
(enforcing "the strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause").
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discriminatory or unduly burdensome regulations of interstate
commerce, when the text of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 appears to
be nothing more than a grant of power to Congress. Numerous other
examples could be adduced in which sound textual arguments would
stand no realistic chance of prevailing because of contrary doctrine.
Therefore, it is appropriate in interpreting the Second Amendment or
any constitutional provision to begin with doctrine rather than text. 22
Let us turn, then, to the cases.
The Supreme Court has never upheld an individual's Second
Amendment objection to prosecution under a law regulating
firearms. Two nineteenth-century decisions, United States v.
Cruikshank23  and Presser v. Illinois,24 held that the Second
Amendment does not apply to the states. 25 Although these decisions
postdated the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, they
predated the modern cases holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. To the
extent that Cruikshank and Presser simply rely on the subsequently
rejected constitutional understanding of Barron v. City of Baltimore,26
they might appropriately be reexamined. This does not, of course,
mean that the Second Amendment necessarily applies to the states.
Upon reexamination, we might conclude, for example, that the
Second Amendment prohibits the federal government from asserting
some measure of control over state units of the National Guard; such
a limit on the federal government for the benefit of the states could
not readily be applied against the states. On the other hand, if the
Second Amendment protects a right of individual firearm ownership
against federal interference, there would be no analytical difficulty in
applying a parallel limit against the states.
The leading case involving the Second Amendment as a limit on
22. I make this point as a practitioner of Supreme Court-focused constitutional law
attempting to answer the question, "What legal effect should be given to the Second
Amendment?" One might criticize the Supreme Court's practice of elevating precedent over
text on any number of grounds, but none of them would be peculiar to the Second Amendment,
and therefore I treat them as outside the scope of this Article. I also put to one side interpretive
approaches that aim to guide decision makers who are at liberty to ignore judicial practice. For
an example, see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999).
23. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
24. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
25. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553; Presser, 116 U.S. at 265.
26. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, and the
Bill of Rights more generally, inapplicable to actions undertaken by state government).
[Vol. 76:291
WHAT DOES THE SECOND A MENDMENT MEAN TODAY?
federal action is United States v. Miller.27 There the Court rejected the
claim that the Second Amendment protected a private right to
possess a sawed-off shotgun because there was no evidence that such
possession bore "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia. ' 2s
The individual right advocates correctly point out that Miller
might plausibly be read to suggest a negative pregnant: "if the sawed-
off shotgun had been a militia weapon, then," on this reading, the
defendants "would have had a constitutional right to possess it."'29 By
further implication, in general, individuals would have a Second
Amendment right to private possession of whatever weapons might
be useful in military service. Miller does, after all, describe with
approval state statutes in force at the time of the adoption of the
federal Constitution organizing militias out of the (adult white male)
citizens, who (according to the statutes) were to bring their own
weapons when called to muster.30 When not called to muster, the
argument goes, the people are entitled to, in the terms of the Second
Amendment, "keep" their weapons.
Miller itself does not exclude this possibility; but neither does
Miller compel it.1 Indeed, we extrapolate from the logic of Miller at
our peril, because, under modern conditions, it would seem to grant
the most constitutional protection to just those weapons that are least
suitable to private possession-distinctly military "arms" such as
tanks, attack helicopters, rocket launchers, or even nuclear weapons.3 2
More importantly, the Supreme Court has not read Miller to
imply anything resembling an individual right to firearms possession.
For example, in a 1980 case, Lewis v. United States,33 the Court upheld
a federal statute prohibiting a convicted felon from possessing
27. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
28. Id. at 177.
29. Eugene Volokh et al., The Second Amendment As a Teaching Tool in Constitutional
Law Classes, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591, 595 (1998) (asking, somewhat rhetorically, whether this is
not the best reading of Miller).
30. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 180-82 (quoting Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia
statutes).
31. For a useful analysis of the opacity of Miller, see Powe, supra note 8, at 1326-32.
32. See Erwin Griswold, Phantom Second Amendment "Rights", WASH. POST, Nov. 4,
1990, at C-7. Robert Spitzer makes this point as well, see ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF
GUN CONTROL 33 (2d ed. 1998), but he apparently misapprehends the individual right scholars'
argument when he adds that inferring a negative pregnant from Miller "is foolish on its face ...
because sawed-off shotguns can and do have some military value." Id. That may be true, but
plainly the Miller Court thought otherwise, and the individual right scholars' argument turns on
what the Miller Court's premises were, not whether those premises were correct.
33. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
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firearms. If the Court had been interested in safeguarding an
individual right of firearms possession for law-abiding citizens, the
Court could have relied on the fact that prohibitions on firearms
possession by felons date back to colonial times.34  Yet the Lewis
Court went considerably further in undermining constitutional
protection for an individual right. It cited Miller for the proposition
that the statute at issue did not "trench upon any constitutionally
protected liberties."3
Or consider Adams v. Williams, which rejected a Fourth
Amendment challenge to a "stop-and-frisk" based on an informant's
tip that the defendant was in illegal possession of narcotics and a
handgun.36 Dissenting, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Marshall,
argued that the danger to the police in street encounters with suspects
stemmed not from the niceties of the Fourth Amendment, but from
the state's failure to enact strict gun control laws. Citing Miller,
Justice Douglas opined that "[t]here is no reason why all pistols
should not be barred to everyone except the police."37 No member of
the Court took issue with this statement.38
These decisions suggest that, without directly facing the question,
the Supreme Court has come to understand Miller as standing
roughly for the collective right view of the Second Amendment.39
With one recent exception, the lower federal courts have also
understood Miller this way.4° As a matter of doctrine, the most that
can be said for reading the Second Amendment to confer an
34. See TRIBE, supra note 1, at 902-03.
35. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65 n.8.
36. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
37. Id. at 150 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38. But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (equating "the
people" of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments as well as the
Preamble); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (including "the right
to keep and bear arms" in a catalogue of individual rights).
39. See also Burton v. Sills, 394 U.S. 812 (1969) (dismissing appeal for want of a federal
question, where the New Jersey Supreme Court read Miller to stand for the proposition that the
federal government "may regulate interstate firearms so long as the regulation does not impair
the maintenance of the active, organized militias of the states," Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521, 527
(N.J. 1968)).
40. See Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 101 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Consulting the text and history
of the Amendment, the Court [in Miller] found that the right to keep and bear arms is meant
solely to protect the right of the states to keep and maintain armed militia."); Love v. Pepersack,
47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Since [Miller], the lower federal courts have uniformly held
that the Second Amendment preserves a collective, rather than an individual, right."); United
States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Since the Miller decision, no federal court
has found any individual's possession of a military weapon to be reasonably related to a well
regulated militia.") (internal quotations omitted). The exception is United States v. Emerson, 46
F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
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individual right to own and carry firearms is that constitutional
doctrine does not pose an insuperable obstacle to that reading,
although its adoption would mark a substantial change in the
prevailing view, and presumably would have to satisfy the criteria
ordinarily thought to justify such a change.41
Before moving to textual arguments, I should consider an
objection to the conclusion that current doctrine stands against the
individual right view: Miller did not actually hold that the Second
Amendment protects no individual right to firearms possession, so
cases or individual opinions treating Miller as if it did are not entitled
to the weight of precedent. This is not a trivial objection; however,
and this is the point I wish to emphasize, the objection applies to
much more than Second Amendment jurisprudence. For example,
much of the rationale for the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education42 rested on an examination of the harms caused
by racial segregation in education;43 yet the Court, without
explanation, rapidly applied Brown to invalidate racial segregation in
a wide variety of other contexts. 44
Nor has this process of precedent-setting without judicial opinion
been confined to the expansion of individual rights. As in the
interpretation of the Second Amendment, so too have First
Amendment rights been restricted to less than they might have been
by somewhat unreflective citation. For example, current First
Amendment law affords less protection to labor picketing than to
otherwise comparable speech outside the labor context.45  The
difference in treatment is essentially a historical legacy: labor
decisions predating modern free speech doctrine continue to be cited
as good law, and for that reason, remain good law. 46 Furthermore,
and more broadly, as Justice Kennedy has noted, even the now-
41. One may think, as I do, that the Supreme Court overstates the force of precedent in
constitutional law in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992), but there is
near-universal acknowledgment that a departure from existing constitutional understandings
requires some greater justification than the naked belief that those understandings are
mistaken.
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. See id. at 489-95.
44. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (invalidating racial
segregation in public transportation); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per
curiam) (golf courses); City of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam)
(beaches).
45. See James Gray Pope, The First Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Right
to Organize in the Twenty-First Century, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 941, 950-53 (1999).
46. See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 616 (1980)
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a prohibition on secondary boycotts).
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canonical view that content-based regulation of speech can be
justified if the government satisfies the compelling interest test came
into being by a series of sloppy citations. 7 Yet despite his well-
documented protest, Justice Kennedy convinced none of his
colleagues to reexamine the test.
These examples illustrate a quite basic point that the objection
under consideration ignores: the force of doctrine qua doctrine does
not rest on how it came into being any more than it rests upon the
soundness of the arguments that can be advanced for it. The main
point of following precedent is to follow it when there is a plausible
argument that it is wrong. There are, of course, occasions when
constitutional precedents are abandoned because they are very
clearly wrong or because they have become unworkable, and some
(including me) have argued that the Supreme Court should be willing
to reexamine its precedents more frequently than it does.48 But as a
matter of doctrine understood in the conventional way, the case for
the individual right view of the Second Amendment remains a very
weak one. To put the matter in lawyerly terms, champions of the
individual right view of the Second Amendment must satisfy a heavy
burden of persuasion. They must make an overwhelming rather than
a just barely convincing case for their view. Turning to the remaining
criteria of constitutional interpretation, we will see that this is a tall
order.
II. TEXT
Recall the text of the Second Amendment: "A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." The preamble
is arresting. Only one other operative provision of the Constitution
contains anything resembling it. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 gives
Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." What
are we to make of such preambles? One answer would be to treat
them as purely hortatory. But even if one believes (as I do not) that,
in general, the interpretation of authoritative text should proceed
47. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
124-27 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
48. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court 1997 Term, Foreword: The Limits of
Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4,60-73 (1998).
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without any consideration of the background purposes of its adopters,
surely that principle of construction does not apply when the
lawmakers have stated their purpose in equally authoritative text.
The Second Amendment's preamble is no scrap of legislative history
taken from a largely overlooked committee report or poorly attended
floor debate. It is part of the Constitution and should therefore
inform our understanding of the rest of the sentence of which it is a
part.
The Preamble to the Constitution as a whole provides a useful
parallel. Although it creates no judicially enforceable rights or duties
directly, the Preamble has been used, quite appropriately, to shed
light on the meaning of other judicially enforceable provisions.49 I am
suggesting that a similar use should be made of the Second
Amendment's preamble-and, although this is beyond the scope of
this Article, the preamble to the Copyright and Patent Clause as well.
To the extent that we are unsure what a right to keep and bear arms
entails, the Second Amendment's preamble provides guidance.
The relevance of the Second Amendment's preamble to its
meaning would seem so obvious as not to need justifying were it not
for academic efforts to minimize its weight. 0 For example, Volokh
points out that provisions of state constitutions of the founding era
commonly contained preambles of the sort we see in the federal
Constitution's Second Amendment. Those provisions involved not
only the right to bear arms, but a diverse collection of other rights,
including freedom of speech and the press, the right to trial by a local
jury, and many more.51 Volokh draws two inferences from the
existence of these provisions: first, the framers' decision to include a
preamble in the Second Amendment was mere stylistic happenstance,
to which virtually no significance can be attributed." Second, reading
the contemporaneous state constitutional provisions alongside the
Second Amendment drives home the lesson that even when a
constitutional provision's operative clause is over or under inclusive
49. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 821 n.31 (1995) (relying on
the fact that the Preamble invokes the authority of "the People of the United States," rather
than that of the delegates of the several states). See generally Milton Handler et al., A
Reconsideration of the Relevance and Materiality of the Preamble in Constitutional
Interpretation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 117 (1990).
50. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 466-67; William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment
and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1242 (1994).
51. See Volokh, supra note 5, at 794-95, 814-21.
52. See id. at 796 ("[T]he Second Amendment is just one of many constitutional provisions
that happen to be structured this way.").
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with respect to its justification clause, it is still the operative clause,
and not the justification clause, that controls.53 Although we might
not think "that entirely unfettered freedom of speech in the
legislature"54 is, in the words of the justification clauses of the Speech
and Debate Articles of the Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Vermont constitutions, "essential to the rights of the people,"55 we
would nonetheless be obliged to give full effect to the operative
language of those provisions. Volokh argues for similar treatment for
the Second Amendment: even if we no longer believe that "A well
regulated Militia" is "necessary to the security of a free State," we
nonetheless must respect "the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms."
Although I agree with the overall thrust of Volokh's argument, it
does not, in my view, carry us very far in the direction of the
individual right interpretation of the Second Amendment. I should
begin by noting my substantial disagreement with Volokh's first
inference. As a matter of textual interpretation of the Second
Amendment, it is largely irrelevant that clause preambles are
commonplace in other documents. In the United States Constitution,
the inclusion of a preamble marks the Second Amendment as
extraordinary. The frequent use of clause preambles in contem-
poraneous documents does, I concede, shed some light on the
subjective intent of those who drafted the Second Amendment as well
as, perhaps, the most common understanding of the political
community at the time. However-and here Volokh's second
argument undermines his first-it is the text itself, not the subjective
intent of the drafters nor even the background understanding of the
time, that was enacted. In the case of the Second Amendment as it
appears in the federal Constitution, that text is striking for containing
its own preamble.
I do not read Volokh as ultimately disagreeing. He says: "To the
extent the operative clause is ambiguous, the justification clause may
inform our interpretation of it, but the justification clause can't take
away what the operative clause provides. '5 6 I agree, as, apparently,
does David Williams-one of the principal champions of the
53. See id. at 801-07.
54. Id. at 799.
55. See MASS. CONST. pt. I, art XXI (1780); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XXX (1784); VT.
CONST. ch. I, art. XVI (1786).
56. Volokh, supra note 5, at 805.
[Vol. 76:291
WHAT DOES THE SECOND AMENDMENT MEAN TODAY?
collective right interpretation of the Second Amendment. 7 The real
disagreement between Volokh, on the one hand, and Williams and
myself, on the other hand, has nothing to do with the general function
of clause preambles; instead, we disagree over whether the operative
clause standing alone is ambiguous. In my view, protecting a "right of
the people to keep and bear Arms" is a sufficiently odd way of
protecting an individual right to possess firearms for rebellion, self-
defense, or hunting as to provoke further inquiry.
As I note in the next Part, at the time of the founding, the phrase
"bear arms" was most commonly used in a military setting,5 8 and even
today it carries a military connotation. This is not to say that people
do not use the phrase to refer to individual firearm possession-they
do. However, many of the people who use the term that way do so
for a distinctly political purpose: they aim to associate the language of
the Second Amendment with private firearms possession for
rebellion, self-defense, or hunting. For example, the home page of
the NRA touts all that the organization does for "your Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms. 5 9 The political import of
this use of the Second Amendment's language is difficult to miss. By
repeatedly associating the Second Amendment's language with its
own political aims, the organization increases the likelihood that, over
time, the language will simply come to be synonymous with those
aims.
A strict originalist would object that, to the extent that the NRA
uses the words of the Second Amendment to mean something
different from their common understanding in 1791, the new usage
should have no bearing on authoritative constitutional interpretation.
However, I am not a strict originalist and would therefore eschew this
objection. Abolitionists were fully entitled to invoke the
Declaration's statement that "[a]ll men are created equal" in pursuit
of ends that its drafters would have rejected. 60 Even without
accompanying changes in constitutional text, constitutional change
57. See David C. Williams, Response: The Unitary Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
822, 824 (1998) ("Rather than using the purpose clause to trump the operative clause, I have
sought to interpret the latter in light of the former, so that there is no tension between the
two.").
5& See infra text accompanying notes 110-14.
59. Wayne LaPierre, NRA Homepage (visited Dec. 22, 1999) <http://www.nra.org>
(statement of Wayne LaPierre, Executive Vice President).
60. See J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1703, 1716 n.28 (1997) (discussing Frederick Douglass's contention that the Constitution
should be read in light of the Declaration). For the contrary, canonical ante-bellum view, see
State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368, 375-76 (1845).
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can legitimately come about because of a political struggle that aims
to capture hearts and minds through language. 61
Therefore, I do not question the legitimacy of the NRA's efforts
to tie the language of the Second Amendment to its political agenda.
Should those efforts succeed, and should the language of the Second
Amendment widely come to be understood as synonymous with a
right to private possession of firearms for rebellion, self-defense, or
hunting, the plain meaning argument for that interpretation would be
accordingly strengthened. However, and this is the critical point, the
NRA has not (yet) won its battle. The meaning of "the right to keep
and bear arms" remains hotly contested in a way that other formerly
contested questions of constitutional meaning-such as whether the
most blatant forms of sex discrimination deny the equal protection of
the laws-do not.6 For the time being at least, for a large number of
reasonable interpreters, perhaps a majority, the phrase "keep and
bear arms" is a sufficiently awkward way to protect a right of armed
rebellion, self-defense, or hunting to warrant a search for some
alternative interpretation.
Yet, considered in the light of twenty-first-century conditions
and sensibilities, the Second Amendment is baffling. What exactly is
the militia, and how does protecting a right to keep and bear arms
contribute to a "well-regulated" one? We are accustomed to thinking
that rights act to impede rather than to further government
regulation. Perhaps the answer is that "the people" who have a right
to keep and bear arms are the people in a collective capacity,63 so that
the right at stake is, at least in substantial measure, what Benjamin
Constant famously called a "liberty of the ancients" - a collective
right of self-governance-rather than a "liberty of the moderns"-a
right against the government. 64 But if this is so, the individual right
61. Gary Wills argues that President Lincoln's Gettysburg Address accomplished just such
a transformation. See GARY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG (1992).
62. See Lawrence Lessig, Response: The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory: What a
Constitutional Theory Should Be, 85 GEO. L.J. 1837, 1845-46 (1997) (discussing the relevance to
constitutional interpretation of changed attitudes regarding sex discrimination); see also Michael
C. Dorf, Reply: Recipe for Trouble: Some Thoughts on Meaning, Translation and Normative
Theory, 85 GEO. L.J. 1857, 1867-68 (1997) (replying to Lessig's claim that I offer normative
claims as if they were factual ones).
63. See David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying
Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 577-78 (1991) (noting the founders' "rhetorical
identification" of the militia, and by implication, the people, "with the whole of the citizenry");
Williams, supra note 57, at 824 (reading "'People' to mean the Body of the People").
64. See BENJAMIN CONSTANT, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the
Moderns (1819), in BENJAMIN CONSTANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS 297, 307 (Biancamaria
Fontana ed. & trans., 1988).
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scholars like to ask, how do we account for the fact that other
provisions of the Bill of Rights, which we understand as rights against
the government, use the very same term, "the people?"
65
The short answer is that the Constitution was the product of
human hands and, therefore, there would be nothing particularly odd
if it used the same word to mean different things in different contexts:
to assume otherwise is to commit "the fallacy of hyper-integration-of
treating the Constitution as a kind of seamless web. '66 Nonetheless,
individual right scholars pursue just this course.
Many individual right scholars also say that the militia and the
people are one and the same.67 This equation, however, proves to be
enormously embarrassing. If the "people" of the Second Amend-
ment are the same "people" we encounter elsewhere in the
Constitution, then the "militia" of the Second Amendment must also
be the "militia" of Articles I and II, and individual right scholars
indeed assume as much.68 Yet Perpich v. Dod, 69 a unanimous 1990
ruling of the Supreme Court, treats the militia of Articles I and II as
identical to Congress's statutory definition of the militia.70 That
65. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 51
(1998) ("'[T]he people' at the core of the Second Amendment are the same people at the heart
of the Preamble and the First Amendment."); MALCOLM, supra note 8, at 162; Volokh, supra
note 5, at 802.
66. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 25
(1991).
67. Individual right scholars like to quote [founding-era] statements equating the militia
with the people, such as the following remark of George Mason: "Who are the militia? They
consist now of the whole people ... " George Mason, Virginia Debates on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution, in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, 367, 425 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippincott Co., 2d ed. 1836). See, e.g., Anthony J. Dennis, Clearing the Smoke from the Right to
Bear Arms and the Second Amendment, 29 AKRON L. REV. 57, 77 n.91 (1995); Don B. Kates,
Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 204, 216 n.51 (1983); Reynolds, supra, note 2, at 473. I note that these scholars rarely cite
the remainder of Mason's observation, which reveals that he understood near-universal militia
service to be subject to legislative abolition, absent contrary language in the Constitution. See
Mason, supra, at 425 ("I cannot say who will be the militia of the future day."). Nor do they
note that the debate from which this quotation is taken focused on the balance of power
between the state and federal governments, see id. at 410-452, as Mason himself makes clear in
his call for what eventually became the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 442 ("I wish a clause in
the Constitution, with respect to all powers which are not granted, that they are retained by the
states.").
68. This equation is implicit in individual right scholars' reliance on statements like
Mason's, see MASON, supra note 67, at 425, as he was discussing the term "militia" as it appears
in the original Constitution.
69. 496 U.S. 334 (1990).
70. I use the constitutional term "militia" here, as the Perpich Court did, to mean what the
twentieth-century statutes have called the "reserve" or "unorganized" militia. See id. at 342; see
also SPITZER, supra note 32, at 29.
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statutory definition expressly excludes women who are not members
of the National Guard and men who are not able-bodied and (unless
they are former members of the regular armed forces who enlisted in
the National Guard before they turned sixty-four) under forty-four
years of age.71 Thus, the individual right scholars' theory would deny
a right to own or possess firearms to the disabled, to most women, to
most middle-aged men, and to all older Americans. Worse still,
because the militia of Articles I and I equals the militia of the
Second Amendment equals the people of the Second Amendment
equals the people of the other provisions of the Constitution, all
constitutional liberties would appear to be ruled out for these groups,
which comprise a majority of the adult population.
How can the individual right scholars avoid these absurd
implications? They might argue that Perpich is simply wrong,
although they would face a stiff burden of persuasion in contesting a
unanimous decision (authored by Justice Stevens, a Bronze Star Navy
veteran) and a Congressional interpretation that has not changed
significantly in nearly a century.7 2 Alternatively, the individual right
scholars could say that the militia and the people were thought to be
synonymous in 1791 but the meaning of the terms has since diverged.
Yet such an approach would explain Perpich by conceding that the
meaning of words in the Second Amendment can change over time, a
concession that would seem fatal for the more strongly originalist
variants of the individual right theory. 73 We will see next how, even
without this difficulty, the original understanding provides at best
tenuous support for the individual right view.
III. ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING AND STRUCTURAL INFERENCE
Professional historians seem to enjoy chiding judges and legal
academics for the way the latter employ historical material. The
charge typically takes one or more of three forms. First, historians
object to what they see as incompetence.7 4 Second, they decry the
71. See 10 U.S.C. § 311(a) (1999); 32 U.S.C. § 313(a) (1999).
72. See Perpich, 496 U.S. at 342 n.11 (citing the Dick Act, 32 Stat. 775 (1903)). Indeed, as
Spitzer shows, the movement away from defense by unorganized militia and towards defense by
federal forces plus reserve forces organized by state was well under way early in the nineteenth
century. See SPITZER, supra note 32, at 28-29.
73. This is not a failing of Amar's theory. As we shall see, his view that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to own and possess firearms critically depends on the
idea that constitutional meaning changes over time. I find Amar's view unconvincing for
somewhat different reasons. See infra text accompanying notes 159-178.
74. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
[Vol. 76:291
WHAT DOES THE SECOND AMENDMENT MEAN TODA Y?
pervasiveness of "law office history," in which advocates "pick and
choose facts and incidents ripped out of context that serve their
purposes."75 Painful though they may be, these two criticisms are well
taken: within the limits of what is possible for those whose concerns
extend beyond historical inquiry for its own sake, no one would
defend incompetent or biased work.76
The third common criticism is more problematic, however.
Some historians-especially those who are not also lawyers-labor
under the misimpression that constitutional interpretation aspires to
recapture original meaning and nothing else, so that nonoriginalist
decisions are, ipso facto, the product of incompetent historical
understanding or illegitimate usurpation. For example, upon
concluding that the founders intended the Second Amendment to
protect a private right of armed self-defense and revolution, Joyce
Malcolm asserts-without any discussion of nonhistorical forms of
constitutional argument-that to take a different view of the Second
Amendment in modern times is to engage in "misinterpretation. '77 If
we disagree with the founders' views, as she understands them, the
only legitimate path is constitutional amendment. 78 Daniel Lazare
makes the identical move, although he is considerably less sanguine
than Malcolm, both because he takes a dimmer view of the wisdom of
an armed populace and because he acknowledges the near
impossibility of securing a constitutional amendment. 79  Malcolm,
Lazare, and many others writing in the field thus appear to be
laboring under what James Fleming has aptly called the "originalist
premise." 80
As I have argued at length elsewhere, the original understanding
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 527 (1995) (lamenting "that habits of poorly supported generalization-
which at times fall below even the standards of undergraduate history writing-pervade the
work of many of the most rigorous theorists when they invoke the past to talk about the
Constitution"); id. at 591 (urging constitutionalists "to do their basic homework").
75. Id. at 554. Accord G. Edward White, Reflections on the "Republican Revival":
Interdisciplinary Scholarship in the Legal Academy, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1994).
76. The qualification is important, however. See Cass Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 601, 602 (1995) ("[Wlhat a constitutional lawyer finds from history may, for
legitimate reasons relating to that purpose and that role, be quite different from what a historian
finds there.").
77. MALCOLM, supra note 8, at 176.
78. See id.
79. See Daniel Lazare, Your Constitution Is Killing You, HARPER'S, Oct. 1999, at 57. The
argument is of a piece with Lazare's recent book, which critiques a Constitution he simply
equates with the original understanding. See DANIEL LAZARE, THE FROZEN REPUBLIC: How
THE CONSTITUTION IS PARALYZING DEMOCRACY (1996).




of very old provisions of the Constitution is relevant to modern
interpretation, but not in the reductionist way that strict originalists
and some historians commonly assume. The relevance of original
understanding takes three principal forms. First, if phrases like "keep
and bear arms" or
"well regulated Militia" ha[ve] no commonly accepted modern
usage, a [modern] interpreter would first wish to discern [their]
meaning in the eighteenth century and then to translate that
meaning into modern English. [T]o the extent that text matters to
the modern interpreter, it sometimes will be nearly impossible to
make any sense out of the text without understanding an earlier
historical context.81
Second, "we care about what the framers thought because, whether
we like it or not, our own understanding has been shaped against the
backdrop of theirs." 82 And third, "we believe that the Founders of
the Republic had insight into the problems of government which their
handiwork addressed. 8 3  I have referred to the second and third
reasons for caring about the original understanding as ancestral and
heroic originalism, respectively.84 We clearly have sound reasons for
studying the original understanding, although "[n]othing in this
enterprise commits the modern reader to seeking or to following the
intentions of the eighteenth-century adopters of the language." 85 In
this spirit, let us look to the original understanding of the Second
Amendment.
A historian interested in unearthing the founders' full views on
the right to keep and bear arms would no doubt begin with the
seventeenth-century English experience, culminating in the English
Bill of Rights of 1689.86 From this experience, Americans drew the
Whig lesson that standing armies-a somewhat ambiguous idea even
in the eighteenth century-posed a serious threat of tyranny. 87 They
"also had firsthand experience with European military practices that
reinforced political theory and identified the standing army in
81. Dorf, supra note 7, at 1797-98.
82. Id. at 1801.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 1797-98.
86. For an example of such a study, see MALCOLM, supra note 8. For a quite different
reading of the English experience, see Michael A. Bellesiles, Gun Laws in Early America: The
Regulation of Firearms Ownership, 1607-1794,16 LAW & HIST. REV. 567, 571-73 (1998); Lois G.
Schwoerer, To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 27, 30-31
(2000).
87. See RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION
OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-1802, 3-4 (1975).
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American minds as a foreign, anti-libertarian institution. '88 Remote
and local experience came together in the Revolutionary War.
Among the colonists' principal complaints against George III was his
use of the military against the civilian population. In the words of the
Declaration of Independence, "He has kept among us, in times of
peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures. He
has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the
Civil power. '89
Many colonists believed that severing the tie to England was not
by itself sufficient to avert such harms. Even as the Revolutionary
War was being fought, they included in the Articles of Confederation
provisions designed to ensure that domestic government would not
become tyrannical in the way that George III's rule had. Article VI
prohibited states from maintaining a peacetime navy or a peacetime
standing army without Congressional authorization and obligated the
states to equip and train a militia. Article IX authorized Congress to
maintain a national navy and to requisition state forces for a national
army, but required a supermajority for waging war. The Articles thus
employed civilian control of the military and the continued existence
of state militias as the means to avert tyranny.
The original Constitution further concentrated military power in
the federal government. Federalists who had seen the Continental
army outperform the militia during the Revolution-including,
especially, George Washington-favored a strong national military
force,9° while most Antifederalists grudgingly accepted the need for
some national military institutions. 91 In the Constitution that
emerged, civilian control of the military was assured through both the
executive and legislative branches. The president was designated
Commander in Chief of federal forces and of the state militias when
called into service, while Congress was granted authority over
funding, maintenance, training, and use of federal land and naval
forces, as well as state militias. No provision of the original
Constitution exactly paralleled the Articles' requirement that states
maintain their militias, although one can probably be inferred from
88. Id. at 4.
89. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, in CONTEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 37, 38
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1999).
90. See KOHN, supra note 87, at 9-10; GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT 31-36 (1999).
91. See MALCOLM, supra note 8, at 151. For the development of the schism between




the assumption that militias would exist to be called upon by the
federal government and from the reservation to the states of the
power of "[a]ppointment of the Officers, and the Authority of
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress."92
The story of the ratification debate is a familiar one.
Antifederalists objected to the strength of the federal government.
To the extent that opponents of ratification worried about arms, their
principal concern was that the federal government would establish a
standing army.93 Ratification was obtained through a bargain. "[I]n
order to gain acceptance of their handiwork, the Federalists had to
commit themselves, unofficially, to the formulation of a bill of rights
when the first Congress met in 1789. '94 The ultimately enacted Bill of
Rights contained what is now the Second Amendment.
And therein lies the puzzle, for the Second Amendment does
nothing to prevent the maintenance of a federal standing army, nor
does it remotely insulate state militias from federal control.95
Congress retains the authority to prescribe training for state militias
and to call them into federal service, while the president commands
them when thus called. Why, then, did Antifederalists and others
who disdained standing armies settle for the Second Amendment?
My admittedly amateur reading in the area leads me to conclude
that even professional historians specializing in the period do not
have a definitive answer to this question, although there are a number
of possibilities. One possibility, of course, is that the founders were
principally interested in protecting an individual right to rebellion and
self-defense, but there are at least two other, in my view more
plausible, explanations of the apparent mismatch between the Second
Amendment and the goals of those who feared federal power. First,
some, perhaps most, of the framers and ratifiers of the Second
Amendment may have believed that it would serve to negate the
inference from the 1787 text that standing federal forces were
anything more than a necessary evil. As Madison argued, removing
federal control of the militia would have left the federal government
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
93. See MALCOLM, supra note 8, at 155-56 (describing ratification debates in Massa-
chusetts, Virginia, and Pennsylvania).
94. MICHAEL KAMMEN, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION at vii, xix
(Michael Kammen ed., 1986); see also Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental
Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1187 nn.47-50 (1996) and sources cited therein.
95. The point was not lost on astute Antifederalists. See MALCOLM, supra note 8, at 163
(citing Centinel, Revived, no. 24, INDEP. GAZETrEER (Sept. 9, 1789)).
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more, rather than less, dependent on a standing army.96 In an era
before judicial review was firmly established as the principal means of
enforcing constitutional safeguards, the Second Amendment would
have been understood as a reminder to Congress to prefer defense by
militia to defense by standing army.97
A second possibility is that the Second Amendment was
intended to protect the states' right of organized resistance against
federal tyranny. Once again, Madison is instructive. In The Federalist
No. 46, he explains why, given the representation of the states in the
federal government, resort to such resistance would not be necessary.
But, he goes on, "[e]xtravagant as the supposition is" that the federal
government would accumulate a standing military force for the
purpose of destroying the states,
let it, however, be made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the
resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the
devotion of the Federal Government; still it would not be going too
far to say, that the State Governments, with the people on their
side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to
which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be
carried in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the
whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able
to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United
States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men.
To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a
million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men
chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties,
and united and conducted by Governments possessing their
affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a
militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a
proportion of regular troops. 98
Some scholars point to The Federalist No. 46-especially Madison's
statement, immediately following the text quoted above, that "over
the people of almost every other nation," Americans possess "the
advantage of being armed" 99-in support of the individual right
interpretation of the Second Amendment.100  Yet the armed
96. See id. at 156.
97. See id. at 164.
98. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison). Accord THE FEDERALIST NO. 29
(Alexander Hamilton) ("[l]f circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an
army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable to the liberties of the people while
there is a large body of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms,
who stand ready to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-citizens.").
99. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison).
100. See, e.g., David Harmer, Securing a Free State: Why the Second Amendment Matters
1998 BYU L. REV. 55, 83-84; Van Alstyne, supra note 50, at 1245.
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resistance Madison contemplates in The Federalist No. 46 quite
clearly occurs under the official aegis of the states-not by self-styled
patriots. The founding generation's conception of armed resistance,
indeed the whole concern over standing armies, is probably best
understood in federalism terms, as part of a struggle between the
states and the federal government rather than between individuals
and (either state or federal) government.
What of Madison's assumption that the people would have arms?
The short answer is that the assumption was inaccurate. Historian
Michael Bellesiles has discovered that fewer than seven percent of
white males in western New England and Pennsylvania owned
working guns upon their deaths.'0' As Garry Wills effectively argues,
Bellesiles's discovery is consistent with other evidence tending to
show that the notion of founding-era militias comprising nearly all
able-bodied adult white males was never more than a myth. 02 The
romantic attachment to the militia arose, Wills contends, because of
their role in keeping order on the home front--protecting against,
among other things, Indian attacks and slave revolts'03 -while the
Continental army won the war against the British.
Why does it matter that the founders' assumptions about an
armed populace were in error? In part it matters because of the
reasons we have for caring about the founders' views. Within the
ancestral category, if we discover that their understanding of the facts
was false, "we may discount their views."' 4 The same logic applies
within the heroic category, when "the framers"' values are simply too
distasteful to count as support for a given proposition. 105 It is in this
spirit, I believe, that Carl Bogus offers his discovery that many of the
supporters of the Second Amendment feared that the federal
government would disarm the militia, and thus disempower the
principal mechanism for suppressing slave revolts. Hence he
concludes his study: "The Second Amendment takes on an entirely
different complexion when instead of being symbolized by a musket
in the hands of the minuteman, it is associated with a musket in the
101. See WILLS, supra note 90, at 29 (citing Michael A. Bellesiles, The Origins of the Gun
Culture in the United States, 1760-1865, J. AM. HIST., Sept. 1996, at 429).
102. See WILLS, supra note 90, at 28-38.
103. See id. at 36-37. On the relation between fears of slave revolts and the Second
Amendment, see Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 309 (1998) [hereinafter Hidden History]; Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1365 (1993).
104. Dorf, supra note 7, at 1809.
105. Id. at 1810.
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hands of the slave holder."1 6 If, as I have argued elsewhere, ancestral
and heroic originalism better capture the relevance of original
understanding to constitutional interpretation than does the social
contract theory of strict originalism, the historical work of scholars
like Bellesiles and Bogus substantially undermines the individual
right position. 1°7
Of course, advocates of the individual right position may fare
better with respect to the first reason I identified above for caring
about original meaning-to understand, in historical context, what
the people who adopted the Second Amendment had in mind. If, in
1791, the language of the Second Amendment was widely understood
to protect an individual right to firearms possession, then that fact
must count somewhat in favor of such a contemporary reading-even
if other factors, including other historical factors (understood through
the lens of ancestral and heroic originalism), ultimately lead us to
reject it. Thus we come to the question: How were the words of the
Second Amendment understood at the time of its adoption?
Begin with the question of who are the militia of the Second
Amendment's preamble. Akhil Amar gives a concise statement of
the individual right perspective: "Nowadays," he writes,
it is quite common to speak loosely of the National Guard as "the
state militia," but two hundred years ago, any band of paid,
semiprofessional, part-time volunteers, like today's Guard, would
have been called "a select corps" or "select militia"-and viewed in
many quarters as little better than a standing army.'08
Here Amar appears to make the same mistake that Madison makes in
The Federalist No. 46; he assumes a false universality of militia
service. Nonetheless, it could be argued this false assumption
reflected founding-era ideology, and it is that ideology-rather than
the facts as they were-that underlies the Second Amendment. On
this reading, the "militia" of the Second Amendment's preamble is
synonymous with the "people" of its operative clause, which in turn
refers to the people in their individual capacities.
Putting aside the anomaly this reading creates given the
106. Bogus, Hidden History, supra note 103, at 408.
107. Like all normative uses of history, this claim can be challenged on normative grounds.
For example, although Bellesiles, Wills, and I believe that the scarcity of guns during the
founding ultimately undermines the individual right interpretation of the Second Amendment,
Volokh argues that it supports that interpretation, because it rebuts a changed-circumstances
claim. See Volokh, supra note 4, at 838 (responding to Williams, supra note 63, at 554). Despite
self-styled originalists' frequent claims to the contrary, appeals to the past are no less
contestable or contested than other kinds of constitutional argument.
108. AMAR, supra note 65, at 51.
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longstanding congressional and judicial understanding of "militia,' 1 9
this is a plausible account of how many eighteenth-century readers
would have approached the language, although certainly there would
have been many readers-including such significant figures as George
Washington-who would not have shared the ideological gloss, and
thus would have distinguished the militia from the people. Still, even
if we score the debate over the original understanding of "militia" as
a bare victory for the individual right scholars, we are left with the
question of what "bear arms" meant.
Overwhelmingly, the term had a military connotation. 110
Although there is no true substitute for the professional historian's
thorough immersion in the original sources of the day, computer
databases can assist the amateur historian in getting a feel for how
terms were used. Searching for the phrase "bear arms" in the Library
of Congress's database of congressional and other documents from
the founding era produces a great many references, nearly all of them
in a military context.111 To be sure, one can find the occasional
disparate usage, especially among Pennsylvanians. For example, the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 provided, in part: "The people
have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the
State." '112 Some Pennsylvania Antifederalists went even further,
proposing an amendment that would have stated, in part, "That the
people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and
their own State, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing
game. ' 113  But while these uses show that the phrase "bear arms"
could be, and sometimes was, adapted to include activities outside of
109. See supra text accompanying notes 67-73.
110. See Garry Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995, at 62, 66.
In my view, Wills somewhat overstates his case, see Robert E. Shalhope, To Keep and Bear
Arms in the Early Republic, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 269, 274-81 (1999), but on this point he is
basically correct.
111. The interested reader should point his or her browser to <http://memory.loc.gov/
ammem/collections/finder.html>, click on "Political Science and Law," and choose a database.
112. PENN. CONST. OF 1776, in 8 WILLIAM FINLEY SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS
OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 279 (1979).
113. Amendments Proposed by Pennsylvania Convention Minority (Dec. 12, 1787), in
EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 173, 174 (1957).
This band of Pennsylvanians also proposed an additional amendment that would have
guaranteed against federal interference private landowners' "liberty to fowl and hunt" on their
own land while protecting that right for everyone on unenclosed public land. See id. In yet
another provision, they would have stripped Congress of the "authority to call or march any of
the militia out of their own State, without the consent of such State, [or beyond] such length of
time.., as such State shall agree." Id. Thus the political views of the proponents of the "killing
game" provision were at one end of the spectrum, and it is a fair inference that they used the
phrase "bear arms" idiosyncratically in pursuit of their strongly Antifederalist political ends.
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the organized military, 14 they hardly cast doubt on the dominant
usage.
Despite these reasons to be cautious, there are, in my view, three
nonfrivolous (but ultimately unpersuasive) reasons why one might
conclude that when it was adopted the Second Amendment conferred
an individual right to own firearms. First, as Volokh notes, a right to
bear arms appeared in state constitutions of the founding era, where
it would have had nothing to do with federalism.115 He therefore
infers that at the founding a right to bear arms-whether it appeared
in a state or the federal constitution-was understood as a right of the
individual against the government.
There is some plausibility to this argument, I admit, but it may
anachronistically interpret rights. Although Republican Revivalists
have no doubt sometimes overstated their case, they are surely
correct that the modern liberal conception of rights as trumps or
shields against the state was not universally accepted at the
founding. 116 In a period of intellectual upheaval over the meaning of
most public institutions, there would have been nothing especially
anomalous about a state constitution using the language of rights to
protect a liberty of the ancients. "7 Moreover, even if Volokh's
reading of the state constitutions of the day is correct, the phrase
"bear arms" might well have meant something quite different in the
federal Constitution, where, as all acknowledge, it was inspired by
fears about the relative strength of the state and federal governments.
Most importantly, as Saul Cornell cautions, it is easy to (mis)read the
founding through the prism of modern understandings of rights. The
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 coexisted with a loyalty oath
requirement that made quite clear that the right to arms, even for
self-defense, was reserved for those deemed trustworthy by the
state. 118 Similar restrictions in other colonies and states"9 indicate that
114. See Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right
to "Bear Arms", LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1986, at 151,153.
115. See Volokh, supra note 5, at 810-12.
116. For a fair rendition of the brief against the Republican Revival from one of its
sympathizers, see Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, A Book of Laughter and Forgetting: Kalman's
"Strange Career" and the Marketing of Civic Republicanism, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1025, 1025-38
(1998) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996)).
117. See RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 85 (1999) (At the
founding, "[blearers of rights included legislatures, governments, cities, colonies, countries,
specific communities, and 'the people' as a collective entity distinct from individuals."); id. at 87
("many Founding rights were genuinely collective").
118. See Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Second
Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 CONST.
COMMENTARY 221,228-31 (1999).
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even some of the seemingly more expansive protections for arms-
bearing in founding era state constitutions were probably understood
to confer something less than an individual right against the state.
The second plausible historical basis for the individual right
interpretation of the Second Amendment is that many people in the
late eighteenth century believed they had such a right. It is
undoubtedly an oversimplification to believe that there was a single,
well-understood "philosophy" that entitled all adult white male
citizens to possess arms.120 Still, one can find evidence that such a
view was widely held. Blackstone wrote of the people's limited right
"of having arms for their defense" 121 and his views were quite
influential in the colonies. But such a right may well have been
understood as a natural right,122 quite distinct from the positive rights
set out in the Constitution. Although there were certainly some
people among the founding generation who believed that the
Constitution protected all natural rights, 23 the distinction between
natural and positive law was generally understood, if controversial, at
the founding.2 4  Thus, even if some of the founders equated their
119. See Bellesiles, supra note 86, at 574-76; Shalhope, supra note 110, at 273.
120. But see MALCOLM, supra note 8, at ix (asserting the existence of such a "philosophy
behind the right").
121. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139. The full quotation is:
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present mention, is that of
having arms for their defense, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are
allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute, 1 W & M st. 2.c.2. and is
indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and
self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and law are found insufficient to
restrain the violence of oppression.
Id.
122. See, e.g., JAMES WILSON, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 THE WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 307, 335 (J.D. Andrews ed. 1896) ("The defence of one's self, justly called the
primary law of nature, is not, nor can it be abrogated by any regulation of municipal law."),
quoted in Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11
(1988). As Steven Heyman shows, however, many of the founders who believed in natural
rights would not have thought that a right of armed defense existed outside the state of nature.
See Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights and the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 237
(2000).
123. But see PRIMUS, supra note 117, at 88 ("Few Founders rested their rights on nature
alone, and some found natural rights claims dubious.").
124. Compare Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-88 (1798) (Chase, J.) ("I cannot
subscribe to the omnipotence of a State Legislature, or that it is absolute and without controul;
although its authority should not be expressly restrained by the Constitution, or fundamental
law, of the State."), with id. at 399 (Iredell, J., nominally dissenting although actually concurring
in the judgment) ("The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard.").
Federalists who doubted the wisdom of a Bill of Rights questioned whether even specifically
enumerated rights could effectively check government power. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84
(Alexander Hamilton) ("What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which
would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion?").
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natural law views about arms ownership with the Second Amend-
ment's meaning,125 it does not follow that they enacted their
assumption into law-either as a matter of eighteenth or twenty-first-
century logic. 126
This leads me to the third and final plausible (but again
ultimately unpersuasive) historical basis for the individual right
interpretation-the text itself. The Second Amendment protects a
right not only to "bear" but also to "keep" arms. It is possible that
some people understood "keep" to broaden the military connotation
that "bear" would otherwise assume. A militiaman would "bear"
arms only while on active duty, but when not called to muster he
would "keep," that is maintain private possession of, his weapon-
therefore having it available to deter tyranny, for self-defense, and
even for killing game.
The principal difficulty with this last argument is that "keep and
bear" appears to have been understood as a unitary phrase, like
"cruel and unusual" or "necessary and proper." I have not come
across any documents of the period that parse the phrasing as finely
as I have suggested. 127 However, I must acknowledge that if the
distinction between unspoken assumptions and enacted text can be
invoked against a proposed interpretation, it can also be invoked in
favor of that interpretation, and so it is possible that the plain
meaning of "keep" would have been sufficient to connote an
individual right. But then, ironically, our detour through eighteenth-
century history will have left us more or less where we began:
puzzling over the naked text.
While we are revisiting the text, we may wish to pay attention,
finally, to "arms." Even if we assume that the individual right
interpretation of the Second Amendment best reflects the original
understanding, we still must face the question of what "arms" it
protects today. As Wills notes, at the founding, very few Americans
125. See Stephen P. Halbrook & David B. Kopel, Tench Coxe and the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms, 1787-1823, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 347 (1999). But see Heyman, supra note
122, at 237 (arguing that at the founding armed self-defense was not understood as a natural
right within civil society).
126. These days to accuse someone of believing that the Constitution embodies the framers'
views about natural law is to hurl an epithet. See Alden v. Maine, 119 U.S. 2240, 2270 (1999)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
127. Because the collective "right" of defense by militia may have been originally under-
stood to impose an individual duty of militia membership, see infra text accompanying note 152,
we might conclude that in an era of scarce weaponry the inclusion of "keep" would have been
understood as a command to militia members to have weapons ready where they were not
supplied by the state.
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possessed pistols or rifles, which were not, in any event, considered
effective military weapons.128 Therefore, when the ratifiers of the
Second Amendment saw the word "arms," they would have likely
thought of muskets.
An originalist of the narrowest sort might therefore conclude
that even today "arms" means muskets no more advanced than those
commonly available in 1791. Even if we properly reject that narrow
approach, we are left with the quite subjective task of applying the
founders' understanding of arms to a world they could not have
anticipated. 129  There is no obviously correct "translation. '" 130
Chemical and biological weapons seem clearly out, but why? Is it
because of the enormous harm they can cause? That reasoning could
also support a ban on nearly all modern firearms-which are much
more accurate and powerful than the Revolutionary-era musket.'
These sorts of difficulties are not, of course, unique to the
Second Amendment. Technologically advanced forms of surveillance
call for similar judgments under the Fourth Amendment, for
example. 13 2 And when the Supreme Court decided that radio and
television are easier to regulate than newspapers,'33 it was, in some
sense, applying the founders' understanding of the First
Amendment's protection for "freedom... of the press" to (its
arguably misguided understanding of) the electromagnetic spectrum.
But the judgments that these sorts of cases require are not, primarily,
historical ones; they are normative.
128. See WILLS, supra, note 90, at 29-31.
129. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J.,
concurring) ("[Ilt is the task of the judge in this generation to discern how the framers' values,
defined in the context of the world they knew, apply to the world we know.").
130. See Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 402-03 (1997) (arguing
that there is no clear answer to the question of how much of the founders' world view to
translate and how much to treat as constant).
131. One could distinguish chemical and biological weapons, on the one hand, from long
guns and handguns, on the other, on the ground that the harm caused by the former is largely
indiscriminate. That is probably a sound distinction, but it is a normative distinction, not a
linguistic or historical one.
132. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding electronic eavesdropping
subject to Fourth Amendment requirements), with id. at 364-66 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply because eavesdropping was not considered a
"search" at the founding).
133. Compare Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding a right of reply
to television attacks and television editorials), and National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (upholding FCC's authority to select licensees based on "service to the
community"), with Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating a
Florida statute granting political candidates a right of reply to newspaper attacks).
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IV. POSTADOPTION HISTORY
The difficulties we encounter in applying the Second
Amendment to modern circumstances should focus our attention on
how the world has changed since the founding. There are numerous
salient differences between the modern world and the one the
framers inhabited. The American frontier is closed; many of us live in
large, densely populated cities or suburbs; our population is much
more heterogeneous than it was; in both absolute and per capita
terms we have substantially more firearms than at the founding, and
those we have are much more potent; the United States has become
the leading military power in the world; and the United States
Supreme Court has emerged as an institution committed to
preserving basic liberty and thus preventing tyranny. These and other
developments indicate that even if we had located a completely clear
consensus concerning the meaning of the Second Amendment at the
founding, and even were we committed to a static view of
constitutional meaning, we would face a difficult interpretive task in
applying the founding-era understanding to modern circumstances.
For those (like myself) who are not committed to a static view, the
difficulties multiply.
A full treatment of the subject would inquire how the prevailing
understandings of the Second Amendment changed over time,
beginning at the founding and taking us right to the present moment,
through a process that Barry Friedman and Scott Smith have aptly
termed "sedimentary.113 4  My somewhat condensed account may
appear to leave out many developments, especially those of the very
recent past, but we do well to recall "that because all of our
accumulated history is immanent in us, our constitutional
commitments may be found in more recent, rather than more ancient,
history. ' 135 The impact of recent history will be felt more directly
below when I turn to normative considerations.
This Part focuses on two nineteenth-century events: the Civil
War and the emergence of organized police forces. It sketches some
implications of these events, which implicate, respectively, the
134. Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
5-6 (1998) ("[H]istory is essential to interpretation of the Constitution, but the relevant history
is not just that of the Founding, it is that of all American constitutional history."); see also Larry
Kramer, Fidelity to History-And Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 1636 (1997)
("[D]oesn't a conception that recognizes continuing evolution make sense, especially in light of
our actual experience with governing?").
135. Friedman & Smith, supra note 134, at 8.
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insurrectionist and the self-defense accounts of an individual right to
own firearms. This Part then considers Amar's argument that,
notwithstanding these changes, a nineteenth-century transformation
of the Second Amendment from an insurrectionist to a self-defense
model justifies interpreting it and the Fourteenth Amendment as
protecting an individual right of firearms ownership. Although there
is much I admire in Amar's approach, I find it ultimately
unpersuasive.
A. The Civil War
Perhaps at the founding it was plausible to interpret the Second
Amendment as reserving to the states a right of rebellion should the
federal government become tyrannical. In my view, even then it was
not plausible (in the sense of workable) to assign this right of
rebellion to individuals, as was demonstrated by the role of the militia
in putting down Shays's Rebellion 36 on the eve of the Constitutional
Convention and (after considerable delay) the Whiskey Rebellion137
just three years after the adoption of the Second Amendment. On
both occasions, self-styled patriots objected to what they saw as acts
of tyranny-in the former instance, by the government of
Massachusetts; in the latter, by the federal government. Yet when the
rebels took up arms, they were put down by the militia because, in the
unsurprising judgment of the properly constituted governments, no
tyrannical conditions justified the revolt. These events demonstrated
in the founding era what acts by the likes of Timothy McVeigh have
demonstrated in our own time: that placing a right to rebel against
tyranny in the hands of individuals risks violence by every would-be
Spartacus.
Does a right of rebellion lodged in the hands of the states stand
on a firmer footing than an individual right to rebel? Unlike self-
promoting demagogues and other rash individuals or private groups,
we might imagine that the states in their official capacities would be
motivated to act only in a true crisis of the sort Madison describes in
The Federalist No. 46. However, even in the eighteenth century, this
was a dubious strategy, as was illustrated by the failed attempt by
Madison and Jefferson to rouse the state legislatures in defiance of
136. Although the Massachusetts militia eventually put down Shays's Rebellion, the event
was an important factor in convincing Federalists of the inadequacy of militias even to protect
against domestic threats. See KOHN, supra note 87, at 74-75.
137. See id. at 157-70.
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the Sedition Act through the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. As
a result of that failure, those who feared excess federal power chose a
new strategy that has been effective ever since-they shifted the locus
of opposition to federal policy from the states to a newly organized
opposition political party.13 8
Notwithstanding this shift, prior to the Civil War, perhaps it still
might have been thought that state-organized armed resistance
remained available as the ultimate check on federal power. That
bloody conflagration taught otherwise. In some sense, of course, as
Amar argues, the taking up of arms by the Confederacy was an
"abuse" of the right of resistance because "none of the constitutional
prerequisites for this ultimate form of self-help had been met."'139 But
this observation merely highlights the impracticality of a collective
right of rebellion. We reject an individual right of insurrection
limited to those occasions that truly justify insurrection because we
rightly fear that too many individuals will try to use the right when it
is not justified.14  So too we may rightly reject a state right of
insurrection limited to those occasions that truly justify insurrection
because we rightly fear that states will try to use the right when it is
not justified. 41
Nonetheless, even if, convinced by the lessons of our history, 142
one concludes that there is no constitutionally protected right of
rebellion, it would still be possible to defend an armed populace on
the ground that it poses the threat of rebellion or resistance that keeps
the government in line. Just as nuclear arms are more useful as a
deterrent than in war, so, it could be argued, an individual (or, for
that matter, a state) right to bear arms acts as a sword of Damocles.
Yet if we accept this logic-which is dubious even in the case of
nuclear weapons143-we undermine one of the main protections
138. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1519 (1994).
139. Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
483, 501 (1991); accord Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425,
1499-1500 (1987) (arguing that the Confederacy's claimed right of secession was not and could
not have been justified under the Federalists' theory of a right to revolt against a national coup).
140. Timothy McVeigh's invocation of Jefferson upon his arrest is a chilling case in point.
He wore emblazoned on his shirt Jefferson's statement that "[tlhe tree of liberty must be
refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants." Jo Thomas, Trial Begins in
the Oklahoma City Bombing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1997, at Al.
141. McVeigh completes the circle in grisly fashion. The shirt that bore Jefferson's words on
the back, paid homage to John Wilkes Booth on the front, carrying his image, as well as
Lincoln's, along with Booth's "Sic Semper Tyrannis." Id.
142. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 1815 (discussing the lessons the Civil War taught).
143. See Jonathan Schell, The Unfinished Twentieth Century: What We Have Forgotten
About Nuclear Weapons, HARPER'S, Jan. 2000, at 41.
20001
CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW
against tyranny in the modern age: the right of free speech. Modern
free speech doctrine-which is much more permissive than the
original understanding of free speech 144-draws a critical distinction
between speech and action.145  However difficult the task of
distinguishing "advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy directed
at promoting unlawful action,' 1 46 and even if expressive conduct is
"100% action and 100% expression,' ' I47 there is no plausible argument
that stockpiling weapons is protected expression. Yet, if the right to
own but not use weapons is protected as a means of deterring
tyranny, must the government wait to act until the weapons are
actually used? It is difficult to see how the government could
intervene to prevent serious harm at an earlier point except by
distinguishing among the political aims of weapons-owners. It would
be a bizarre doctrine indeed that permitted one either to teach the
(abstract) necessity of overthrowing the government or to stockpile
weapons, but not to engage in both otherwise protected activities.
The point is not simply that as the putative right of insurrection
has come to be seen as less useful, the right of free speech has taken
over some of the work of preserving liberty. 148 The point is that a
right of private possession of firearms may actually impede the right
of free speech in doing that work.
B. Police
"In the eighteenth century the primary responsibility of the
militia was not public defense but internal security. 1 49 Professional
police forces as we know them today were first created in the
nineteenth century. 10 Prior to the emergence of the police, ordinary
144. According to the received view, the First Amendment has long been understood, at a
minimum, to prohibit prior restraints. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-19 (1931).
More expansive protections did not take firm route in constitutional jurisprudence until the
1960s. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)
(celebrating the demise of the "clear and present danger" test).
145. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
146. Id. at 318. Although nominally an interpretation of the Smith Act, Yates has come to
be understood as a constitutional decision. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 847 (2d ed. 1988).
147. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495-96 (1975).
148. Cf. AMAR, supra note 65, at 49-50 (discussing the need for such "arms" as modems, the
internet, and fax machines).
149. Bellesiles, supra note 86, at 581.
150. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 67-
68 (1993) ("One of the major social inventions of the first half of the nineteenth century was the
creation of police forces: full-time, night-and-day agencies whose job was to prevent crime, to
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citizens would bring what arms they had in response to a "hue and
cry" or when serving on a posse comitatus.151
It is not immediately clear whether the nonexistence of
professional police at the founding strengthens or weakens the
individual right thesis. On a narrowly originalist reading, this fact
serves to highlight that arms possession by members of the militia was
not a strictly military function in the sense of responding to external
threats; it included protecting one's self and one's neighbors from all
manner of threats. If ordinary (white male) civilians performed
functions at the founding like those subsequently assumed by the
police, then, on narrowly originalist premises, it follows that they may
perform such functions today, and this would include possessing
firearms.
On the other hand, the nonexistence of professional police at the
founding may have an impact on what purpose the right to keep and
bear arms served then, and thus, on a less narrowly originalist
approach to interpretation, should tell us something about how to
fulfill that purpose today. To the extent that the Second Amendment
"right" to bear arms was in substantial measure a duty of the
responsible citizenry to participate in the collective self-defense of the
community,152 i.e., to the extent that it was understood as a liberty of
the ancients, the government may be understood to respect that right
today by maintaining professional police. 53
If we take this latter approach,154 further questions arise. If the
state fails to provide adequate police protection against private
violence, do individuals then have a right to resort to armed self-
help?'55 Or, more radically, does the Second Amendment imply a
keep the peace, and to capture criminals.").
151. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820,
832 (1994) (citing FRIEDMAN, supra note 150, at 29, 68, 174, and Pauline Maier, Popular
Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America, 27 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 19 (3d ser.
1970)).
152. See Bellesiles, supra note 86, at 573-74 ("Possession of firearms [in colonial times] was
not understood as a collective right but rather as a collective duty necessary to the defense of
society, with that collectivity precisely defined and far from inclusive.").
153. As Williams argues at length, however, a professional police force would not fulfill the
public participation function of the militia. See Williams, supra note 63, at 572-81. Whether the
militia ever served such a function, and whether, if so, modern forms of community policing or
other forms of local participation serve them as adequately, are questions I do not address.
154. See Levinson, supra note 3, at 656 ("[Olne can argue that the rise of a professional
police force to enforce the law has made irrelevant, and perhaps even counterproductive, the
continuation of a strong notion of self-help as the remedy for crime.").
155. For a suggestion that such a right can be inferred regardless of whether the state
provides police protection because, under DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989),
the state has no constitutional obligation to provide police protection, see David E. Murley,
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right to adequate policing, enforceable by the judiciary if not by self-
help? There are nonfrivolous moral arguments for such entitlements,
whether or not they are rooted in the Second Amendment.
One difficulty with describing the Second Amendment as an
antiquated police provision is the fact that the nation hardly outgrew
the idea of privately owned arms for self-defense as soon as
professional police came on the scene. Throughout the nineteenth
century, much of America remained a frontier society, and armed
self-help was widespread even in urban centers: in the middle of the
nineteenth century, a prominent New York City businessman
reported that, due to fears of mob violence, "most of his friends never
left home without a pistol. '156
The use of privately owned firearms for self-defense seemed to
increase, rather than decrease, even as police forces came on the
scene, and for many the language of arms-bearing came to be
associated with self-defense. This is hardly to say that the Second
Amendment was completely transformed into a private right during
the nineteenth century. The connection between arms-bearing and
the safeguarding of democracy persisted."' But even if one can
quibble over the details of the tale he tells, Amar is generally correct
in claiming that, between the founding and Reconstruction, the right
to bear arms came to be understood less in terms of states' collective
interests against the government and more in terms of individuals'
rights against state interference with their efforts to protect
themselves against private violence.158
How much modern interpretive weight should be given to the
fact that the ideology of gun ownership for self-defense seems to have
grown, rather than diminished, during the nineteenth century? The
most straightforward answer is: not much. We began the present
inquiry by noting that at the founding the militia served a function
Private Enforcement of the Social Contract: DeShaney and the Second Amendment Right to Own
Firearms, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 827,851-53 (1998).
156. Andrew Delbanco, Sunday in the Park with Fred, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 20, 2000, at
55 (reviewing WITOLD RYBCZYNSKI, A CLEARING IN THE DISTANCE: FREDERICK LAW
OLMSTEAD AND AMERICA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1999)) (citing diary of George
Templeton Strong).
157. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 646 (1833) ("The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered
as the palladium of the liberties of a republic, since it offers a strong moral check against the
usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers, and will generally, even if these are successful in the
first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them.").
158. See AMAR, supra note 65, at 259 ("It was now less a right of the people, and more an
individualistic privilege of persons.").
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now generally served by the professional police. At some point
between the founding and the present, many people thought that
private arms for self-help against private violence had taken over (at
least part of) the function of the militia. Eventually, with the closing
of the frontier and the increasing professionalization of police forces,
fewer people came to hold that view. If we want to know how the
founders' conception of the militia and arms-bearing applies in the
modern world, it is not at all clear that we should focus much
attention on the world as it was during the intermediate period of the
nineteenth century. The most salient question would seem to be:
given conditions as they are now, how do we best understand the
founders' text?
C. Incorporation, Reverse Incorporation, and Time Travel
Before concluding that nineteenth-century attitudes towards
arms-bearing have little direct relevance to the twenty-first-century
meaning of the Second Amendment, we must confront an argument
that would give critical importance to the nineteenth-century-or to
be more precise, the 1868-understanding of the right to bear arms.
Amar contends that when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in
1868, a right to bear arms was understood by Reconstruction
Republicans and others as a right of armed self-defense against
private violence. The struggle against slavery had, to use the
vocabulary of the nineteenth century, moved arms-bearing from the
class of political rights like voting, that only belonged to full members
of the political community, into the class of personal or civil rights
like personal security, possessed by all citizens-including white
women and, following the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
blacks. 159 In Amar's view, if a provision of the Bill of Rights "is a
personal privilege-that is, a private right-of individual citizens,
rather than a right of states or the public at large," the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states
from infringing it.160 Thus, he apparently concludes, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects a private right of arms for self-defense against
state interference161
159. See id. at 258-66; see also Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second
Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 333-49 (1991)
(describing the legal restrictions on, and the value of a right to, firearms ownership by blacks
during the nineteenth century).
160. AMAR, supra note 65, at 221.
161. I say "apparently" because Amar would allow many forms of firearm regulation that
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One consequence that seems to follow from this theory is "that
federal gun control legislation would be essentially invulnerable under
the Second Amendment provided the state militia were not
undermined, while state and local gun control legislation would have
to satisfy some heightened form of scrutiny." 6 2 Yet that is a strikingly
odd result, given that the only express reference to arms-bearing
appears in the provision that limits the federal government.
The oddity could be avoided if one imagined that the enactment
of the Fourteenth Amendment simultaneously changed the meaning
of the Second, by a "feedback effect" 163 that Laurence Tribe labels
"time travel."164 Although one might be appropriately skeptical of
any interpretive method called time travel,'165 the phenomenon is in
fact quite familiar. Aside from constitutional amendments that
expressly repeal or modify earlier-enacted provisions, the most
famous example of constitutional time travel is, of course, Boiling v.
Sharpe,166 in which the Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause-ratified by slaveholders in 1791-
prohibited de jure racial segregation in District of Columbia public
schools.
Yet the theory of Boiling most certainly was not that the framers
and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to prohibit de
jure segregation. To the contrary, Brown v. Board of Education, 67 to
which Boiling was a companion, found the evidence of the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment "inconclusive.1 68 Boiling
itself was even more self-consciously presentist, justifying its
conclusion on the ground that any other result would be
"unthinkable.' 169 Clever lawyers can concoct all sorts of arguments
for why Boiling is no more problematic than Brown,'170 but for an
most proponents of the individual right view would not, and because Amar acknowledges that
alternative readings of the Second Amendment may be better suited to our times. See Akhil
Reed Amar, Second Thoughts: What the Right to Bear Arms Really Means, NEW REPUBLIC,
July 12, 1999, at 24, 26-27.
162. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 902 n.221; see also Powe, supra note 8, at 1375.
163. AMAR, supra note 65, at 243 (discussing the First Amendment).
164. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 902 n.221.
165. Tribe himself does not use the term mockingly. See id. at 67.
166. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
167. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
168. Id. at 489, 492 ("[w]e cannot turn the clock back to 1868.").
169. Boiling, 347 U.S. at 500.
170. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 766-73 (1999)
(suggesting justifications for Boiling based on the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the federal Title of Nobility Clause, the federal Bill of Attainder Clause, and
finally, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
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originalist, that still leaves the puzzle of Brown itself. And despite
some determined revisionism, the overwhelming weight of historical
evidence indicates that Brown is contrary to the original
understanding.17
Thus, upon inspection, Boiling undermines, rather than supports,
a reconstructed individual right to own firearms based on the
Amar/Tribe approach, because Boiling decidedly rejects the idea that
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment updated the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment from 1791 to 1868 and froze it there.
Instead, Bolling reflects the common-sense idea that experience over
time can prompt a reexamination of the meaning of prior
commitments, at least where those commitments are embodied in
capacious text. In short, on any plausible reading, Boiling and Brown
stand for the proposition that the meaning of a constitutional
provision need not be fixed by the concrete intentions, expectations,
or understandings of its adopters. 17 2
Nor do Amar and Tribe subscribe to narrow originalism. Tribe
may have backed away somewhat from the view of the Second
Amendment that he and I set forth nearly a decade ago-that it is
"most plausibly.., read to preserve a power of the state militias
against abolition by the federal government,"'-but I do not read
any of his recent work as disavowing the more general point "that we
must look beyond the specific views of the framers to apply the
Constitution to contemporary problems."' 74
As for Amar, he proclaims himself an eclectic who accepts the
legitimacy of textual, historical, structural, prudential, doctrinal, and
ethical forms of argument in constitutional interpretation. 5
Moreover, read as a whole, The Bill of Rights-the book in which
Amar sets forth his narrative of the Reconstruction-era
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1297 n.247 (1995) (relying on the federal Bill of Attainder Clause).
171. For an excellent summary, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller
Court, 104 YALE L.J. 2309, 2337-43 (1995) (reviewing OWEN M. Fiss, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS
OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 (1993)). For a revisionist account, see Michael W.
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995). For a
response, see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response
to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995).
172. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 271 (1996).
173. TRIBE & DORF, supra note 66, at 11.
174. Id. at 13.
175. See Amar, supra note 170, at 754-55 (employing the categories found in PHILIP
BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982)). Amar identifies
yet another category, which he calls "intratextualism." Id. at 748.
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transformation of the Second Amendment and the Bill of Rights
more generally-does not claim that the transformation was
completed upon the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. For
example, his discussion of the First Amendment explains how modern
Supreme Court doctrine could be supported by drawing upon
historical analogies to Reconstruction, 176 but he certainly does not
argue that the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
understood it to enact modern First Amendment doctrine as such.
Moreover, when Amar turns to drawing broad lessons, his goal seems
to be primarily to set the record straight-to replace the mistaken
notion that we inherited our freedoms directly from the founding with
a more accurate picture that celebrates the role of Reconstruction
Republicans.'77
Setting the record straight about the historical origins of our
freedoms need not entail interpreting the Constitution in a narrowly
originalist fashion. Amar and Tribe could be right that by 1868 the
background understanding of arms-bearing had evolved to the point
where a private right of gun ownership was generally thought to be
among the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. But just
as the original "Second Amendment did not enact the background
understanding"' 7 8 circa 1791, neither did the Fourteenth Amend-
ment-the text of which does not expressly mention arms at all-
enact the background understanding circa 1868.
V. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
Our consideration of doctrine, text, structure, and history has not
been value free. In trying to give coherence to case law or to draw
lessons from historical experience, we have necessarily been engaged
in a somewhat normative enterprise. In this Part, I consider
normative arguments more directly. In doing so, I do not deny that
there exists substantial disagreement about the questions under
consideration. But the fact that some people will disagree with an
argument is not a reason not to make the argument.
This Part first addresses the insurrectionist justification and then
turns to a self-defense justification. It argues that some of the
176. See AMAR, supra note 65, at 243.
177. See id. at 293 ("If this book is right, then many of us are guilty of a kind of curiously
selective ancestor worship-one that gives too much credit to James Madison and not enough to
John Bingham, that celebrates Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry but slights Harriet Beecher
Stowe and Frederick Douglass.").
178. TRIBE & DORF, supra note 66, at 11.
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normative disagreement about the desirability of an individual right
to own firearms turns out to be empirical disagreement about the
likely consequences of gun control versus those of an armed
population. To the extent that more purely normative arguments
support some individual right of arms, the right they support does not
closely track the standard individual right interpretation of the
Second Amendment.
A. Insurrection
The insurrectionist argument for an individual right to own
firearms is by now familiar. An armed populace, the argument goes,
will be able to resist a tyrannical government. Indeed, the mere fact
that the people have arms will deter would-be tyrants from seizing the
reins of government for oppressive purposes.
There is a nonconsequentialist and a consequentialist form of
this argument. The nonconsequentialist form links the people's right
to arms with self-government. In the natural law language of the
Declaration of Independence, governments derive "their just powers
from the consent of the governed, [and] whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of [humans' unalienable rights], it
is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it."' 19 Yet if the right
of rebellion is understood in nonconsequentialist terms, it would seem
to inhere not in individuals but in political communities. Individuals
may have a right to participate in self-government, but only the
people in a collective capacity have a right of self-government as such.
Thus, the nonconsequentialist claim that self-government entails a
right to alter (or restore) the form of government by force cannot by
itself justify an individual right to arms.
Notice I do not say that one could not posit a
nonconsequentialist individual right to use force against tyrannical
exercises of government authority. One might think that individuals
have a right to own firearms so that any time the government
attempted to violate their rights, they could resist or threaten
resistance with force. But while such a radically libertarian, indeed
positively anarchistic, view would be internally consistent, it is not the
standard insurrectionist account. In the standard account, the armed
population stands ready to defend the political community as a whole
against tyrants, not to defend every member of the community against
179. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 89, at 37.
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every possible violation of rights.
Nonetheless, one might still invoke notions of self-government to
justify an individual right to own arms. It could be argued that an
individual right to own arms provides the people in their collective
capacity with the means to resist or deter tyranny. This is a
consequentialist or empirical rather than a nonconsequentialist claim.
It asserts that an individual right to own arms will aid in the
preservation of democracy.
Is the empirical claim true? Widespread individual ownership of
and skill in using firearms arguably increase a nation's ability to resist
foreign armies and thus deter foreign attack. It is possible to draw
such a lesson from the experience of Soviet forces in Afghanistan,
although for much of the occupation, the mujahideen received
sophisticated military equipment from the West and the Islamic
world.180 But even granting that it is, ceteris paribus, more difficult for
an invading force to subdue an armed population than an unarmed
one, it is simply fantastic to suppose that a power bent on occupying
the United States would be undeterred by our conventional and
nuclear military forces, yet given pause by the prospect of resistance
from individuals. The twenty-first-century American insurrectionist
claim for arms therefore must rest on an argument about their utility
in resisting tyranny by our own government.
Does an individual right to own arms in fact aid in the
preservation of democracy against threats by a nation's own leaders?
Certainly we can imagine circumstances in which the answer would be
yes. Imagine a fledgling democracy in which there is reason to fear
the despotic tendencies of the highest elected official. The knowledge
that people demonstrating against one of the would-be despot's
policies are armed might well cause him to pause before ordering his
troops to march against the demonstrators. Then again, one might
conclude that even if such scenarios are possible, a heavily armed
populace itself poses risks to democracy. It is a striking fact that none
of the constitutions written since the fall of communism-under
circumstances in which fears of reversion to dictatorship were hardly
fantastic -contains a provision explicitly protecting a right of arms. 81
180. For a response to similar, and similarly exaggerated, claims about the power of armed
individuals to resist foreign invaders in the context of the experience of the United States in
Vietnam, see WILLS, supra note 90, at 25-26.
181. Construing the United States Constitution to confer a robust individual right of gun
ownership would, to my knowledge, render it unique. Even in Switzerland, where there is a
tradition of universal military service and private gun ownership, the constitution contains no
such right. See SWITZ. CONST. art. 7-36 (French version 1999) (visited Jan. 12, 2000)
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Moreover, even if one believes that a private right of gun
ownership is valuable in a new democracy, in a mature democracy,
like the United States, other rights-especially the right of free
speech-perform the day-to-day task of ensuring that the government
serves the people. Above I suggested that robust judicial protection
for an individual right of gun ownership could undermine protection
for freedom of speech because it would problematize the line
between abstract advocacy and dangerous conduct.1 8 It might also be
thought that, to the extent that widely available guns contribute to
crime, they trigger aggressive policing tactics that undermine Fourth
Amendment liberties, as well as policies of mass incarceration that sit
uncomfortably with the ideals of a free society.
In short, if the Second Amendment ever did protect an
individual right to gun ownership for insurrectionist reasons, the
desuetude into which that right has apparently fallen may reflect
more than just archaic language. I am suggesting that whatever
democracy-reinforcing effects a private right to own firearms may be
thought to have tend to decay over time. As the democracy matures,
the risk that a tyrant will seize the reins of government diminishes,
and the threats to liberty come from more mundane abuses. In such
times, robust protection for a private right to own firearms actually
may impede robust protection for the civil and political rights needed
to guard against such mundane but hardly trivial abuses.
There is no guarantee that even a mature democracy such as our
own will not give way to tyranny. The hypothesis that any given
society will be better able to preserve its democracy without an
individual right to firearms than it can with one cannot be proven in
any strict sense. Nonetheless, the factors identified above suggest
that this is the safer bet. Although there are recent examples of
democracy giving way to military rule in our own hemisphere,
typically it was the existence of armed revolutionaries or the
perceived threat of disorder that was used as a justification for the
coup. It is therefore quite possible that a formal right of firearms
ownership would have only increased the frequency of these
occurrences. In any event, the fragility of Latin American democracy
in the twentieth century seems much more a product of weak
traditions of civilian control over the military than a product of the
status of firearms rights.
<www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/101/index.html> (setting forth other fundamental rights).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 143-48.
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In evaluating the likely costs and benefits that an individual right
to firearms ownership would confer on democracy, we make a
complicated prediction in the face of considerable uncertainty. I have
offered some reasons to think that a robust individual right to own
firearms is unnecessary to, and may actually impede the chances for,
the survival of our democracy.
B. Self-Defense
Self-defense provides a considerably stronger justification for a
right of firearms ownership than does the threat of insurrection
against tyranny. Even if the government provides police protection,
some acts of private violence will occur. Should innocent, otherwise
law-abiding citizens have the right to own firearms to protect
themselves in the event that they are the targets of such private
violence?
The most common argument for most forms of gun control-
from laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, to those
requiring trigger locks, even to near-complete bans on possession-is
that firearms possession does not make for greater safety but actually
increases the risk of injury or death. A (hand)gun obtained for
defense against felons has a greater chance, gun control advocates
say, of being used opportunistically against a family member or
discharging accidentally. 183 Others contest these claims. They argue
that accidental firearms deaths are raret 4 and that widespread
firearm ownership reduces (or at least does not increase) violent
crime because criminals are deterred by the risk to themselves if they
attack armed law-abiding citizens.85  Still others point to the
unreliability of the data used to support the safety-enhancing effects
of gun ownership. 186
183. Here is a typical claim taken from the Violence Policy Center's Web site: "For every
time a gun in the home is used in a self-defense homicide, a gun will be used in-1.3
unintentional deaths[;] 4.6 criminal homicides[; and] 37 suicides." <http://www.vpc.org/fact-sht/
hgbanfs.htm> (visited Feb. 18, 2000) (citing A.L. Kellermann & D.T. Reay, Protection or Peril?
An Analysis of Firearm-Related Deaths in the Home, 314 (24) NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557 (1986)).
184. See KLECK, supra note 12, at 304 ("The risk of a gun accident is extremely low, even
among defensive gun owners, except among a very small, identifiably high-risk subset of the
population.").
185. See id. at 203 ("[T]he assumption that general gun availability positively affects the
frequency or average seriousness of violent crimes is not supported."); JOHN R. LOTr, MORE
GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-CONTROL LAWS 19 (1998) ("Allowing
citizens to carry concealed handguns reduces violent crimes.").
186. See, e.g., Otis Dudley Duncan, Gun Use Surveys: In Numbers We Trust?,
CRIMINOLOGIST Jan./Feb. 2000, at 1, 5 ("[T]he three largest, most comprehensive, and
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The complicated empirical and policy judgments required to sort
out these conflicting claims seem best suited to legislative or perhaps
administrative judgment. There is no reason to think that the
legislative process currently excludes the perspectives of those who
oppose various forms of firearm regulation. Indeed, whatever its
precise strength, the fact that the "gun lobby" is widely recognized as
wielding substantial legislative influence indicates that, unlike racial
minorities for example, gun control opponents cannot be
characterized as the victims of a process failure. 187
However, those who support gun rights contend that because gun
control laws limit a constitutional right, the burden of persuasion rests
with the government.188 If we accept their premise, the point is largely
correct. Although we can imagine a regime in which a right to
firearms coexists with extensive regulation-indeed, that appears to
be a fairly apt description of the colonial and founding erasa 9-under
modern doctrine, the recognition of a constitutional right typically
means that the government bears the burden of persuading a court
that the regulation is necessary.
Yet the premise of the gun advocates' argument begs the central
question of whether there is a constitutional right to gun ownership.
If constitutional text, structure, history, and doctrine led us to
conclude that, ceteris paribus, there is a Second Amendment right to
own firearms for self-defense, then the persuasion burden would fall
on those who sought to limit that right. But our inquiry to this point
does not establish such a right, and we have turned to normative
arguments to see whether they provide a clear basis for inferring one.
Therefore, the persuasion burden does not fall on those who would
limit rights of gun ownership, and absent a contrary showing, 19°
technically most sophisticated surveys in this domain are unanimous in being radically
inconsistent with Lott's claim that 98% of defenders 'merely brandish' their weapons.").
187. See generally ELY, supra note 19 at 21 (arguing that the Court acts most legitimately in
setting aside the results of majoritarian politics when the Court acts to compensate for a
systematic defect in the political process). Ely's theory was strongly rooted in prior practice, see,
e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153, n.4 (1938), and has been
influential since he articulated it. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U.S. 432,442 n.10 (1985).
188. See, e.g., Powe, supra note 8, at 1392 ("If the [Second] Amendment has substance, then
it creates presumptions that tilt the debate.").
189. See supra note 118.
190. Under conventional constitutional criteria, even utterly compelling evidence that gun
ownership increased safety would not count as a sufficient reason to recognize a constitutional
right of gun ownership, but in my view, to the extent permitted by institutional limitations, such
pragmatic and empirical issues should play a somewhat larger explicit role in constitutional
adjudication than they currently play. See Dorf, supra note 48, at 56 ("The Court could rely to a
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lawmakers are entitled to infer that there is some causal relation
between the widespread availability of firearms in the United States
and the significantly higher rates of gun violence here than in
otherwise similar countries that regulate firearms more strictly.191
Still, the question of whether there should be a right to own or
possess firearms is not simply a matter of calculating the likely
consequences of such a right. If we say that legislatures are justified
in enacting gun control measures on the ground that, on the whole,
these laws increase personal security, the deontologist will object to
the sacrifice of some individuals' right of personal security. If owning
a firearm makes one individual safer, that individual claims, the
government cannot prohibit such ownership for the benefit of others.
This argument resembles Ronald Dworkin's familiar claim that rights
may not be overridden based on a calculation of costs and benefits,
192
but as we shall see, the claim fails to establish a Second Amendment
right of armed self-defense. 193
greater extent on empirical and policy analysis in its written opinions.").
191. See, e.g., Martin Killias, International Correlations Between Gun Ownership and Rates
of Homicide and Suicide, reprinted in 148 CAN. MED. ASSOC. J. 1721 (1993) (finding a positive
correlation between gun ownership rates, on the one hand, and suicide and homicide rates, on
the other). The most relevant "control" country for a natural experiment would seem to be
Canada. One comparative study concluded that the data "emphatically show that Canadian gun
control, especially the provisions pertaining to handguns, does have the beneficial effect of
saving lives." Catherine F. Sproule & Deborah J. Kennet, Killing with Guns in the USA and
Canada 1977-1983: Further Evidence for the Effectiveness of Gun Control, 31 CAN. J. CRIM. 245,
249 (1989). This conclusion can be contested on the basis of its relatively short period of
investigation. See Robert J. Mundt, Gun Control and Rates of Firearms Violence in Canada and
the United States, 32 CAN. J. CRIM. 137, 139 (1990). However, whatever one ultimately
concludes about the complicated questions of causation, the statistical disparities are certainly
suggestive. The United States has consistently higher rates of firearms and (especially) handgun
possession than Canada, consistently higher rates of crime, and consistently higher percentages
of violent crimes committed with firearms and handguns. See id. at 141-43, 145, 149. Similar
correlations appear when one compares firearms ownership and gun violence statistics from
other industrialized countries. See Martin Killias, International Correlations Between Gun
Ownership and Rates of Homicide and Suicide, 148 (10) CAN. MED. ASSOC. J. 1721 (1993)
(examining 1989 survey data from 14 countries).
192. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 193 ("[T]he prospect of
utilitarian gains cannot justify preventing a man from doing what he has a right to do.").
193. I put aside the objection that in constitutional law, rights are not actually trumps. See
Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 133, 155-56
(1997) (reviewing DWORKIN, supra note 172 and DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH
(1996)); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms,
and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 729 (1998) ("Rights are not general trumps
against appeals to the common good or anything else; instead, they are better understood as
channeling the kinds of reasons government can invoke when it acts in certain arenas."). To
meet that objection, an advocate of the individual right interpretation of the Second
Amendment could recast the trumping claim as a demand that the government satisfy some
form of heightened scrutiny. See id.; Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights,
27 GA. L. REV. 415, 429-31 (1993) (proposing that rights be viewed as shields rather than
trumps and arguing that rights are not trumps on the quite different ground that rights serve
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Consider three schematic cases. A believes that her ownership of
a firearm makes her substantially safer while increasing the risk of
injury or death of innocent third parties at most marginally. Perhaps
A believes that it even makes innocent third parties, in the aggregate,
safer. In fact, however, A's ownership of a firearm increases the risk
of death or injury to herself as well as to innocent third parties. B's
ownership of a firearm increases the risk of death or injury to
innocent third parties to a greater degree than it increases her own
safety, but it does increase her own safety somewhat. C's ownership
of a firearm makes her substantially safer while increasing the risk of
injury or death of innocent third parties at most marginally. Perhaps
it even makes innocent third parties, in the aggregate, safer.
A presents the weakest claim for a right to firearms ownership.
Some constitutional rights are best understood as protecting
decisional autonomy, and are in this sense rights to be wrong. For
example, even if we knew to a certainty that, contrary to the
expectations of a pair of lovers, their marriage would prove to be a
source of nothing but misery to them, we would not grant the
government the power to prevent them from marrying one another.
Part of what makes the decision whether to marry or to have children
valuable is that it is one's own decision.194 One could conceive of a
right to safety in these terms -as a right to decide whether and how to
protect oneself against private violence-but the right then loses most
of its moral force. A is entitled to hold all manner of beliefs, but
when acting on those beliefs risks serious physical harm to A and
others, something more than the fact that A holds a belief is needed
to prevent the government from intervening.
B has a stronger claim than A. Nevertheless, B's claim runs into
the harm principle.195 Her proposed conduct harms third parties,
thereby making it a poor candidate for a right. Moreover, why should
the government prefer B's claim to personal safety over those of third
parties when the latter are, by hypothesis, stronger?
B might say that her claim is a composite of safety and liberty: in
the interest of third parties, the government proposes not only to
expressive functions not captured by the standard account or its competitors).
194. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (stating that some beliefs
"relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education" are so fundamental "to personal dignity and autonomy" that they "could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State").
195. See 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS
WRONGDOING at ix-xx, 318-38 (1988).
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decrease her safety but also to limit her freedom to own a firearm.
Phrased in this way, it looks as if the government is singling out B for
a burden, the benefit of which it confers on others. Yet it should be
recalled that the law imposes the reciprocal burden on all. The third
parties whose safety the gun control law enhances will also have their
own freedom to own firearms restricted. Thus, unless the aspect of
B's freedom that is limited is itself highly prized-and this is the very
issue in dispute-the safety interests of the third parties will
justifiably outweigh the combination of B's safety claim plus her
liberty claim.
C presents a strong claim because the reduction in C's safety
(and freedom) carries no substantial compensating benefit for C or
others. The main problem with C's claim is the difficulty, ex ante, of
distinguishing C from A (or B). Nearly everyone who claims a right
to own firearms will believe that she is a C, or at worst, a B.196 At the
very least, this suggests that the government may legitimately require
trigger locks, safety education, and similar measures as a condition of
firearm ownership licensing, thereby weeding out A's and converting
some of them into C's. But even these measures will not be deemed
sufficient if the government has a reasonable basis to conclude that
firearms possession by properly certified individuals on the whole
increases the risk of death or injury-because accidents still happen,
because the firearm remains available to otherwise cautious people
should they become enraged, and because criminals who have a
substantial reason to believe their victims are armed may more
readily resort to violence themselves.19
Ex post, matters may look somewhat different. Imagine that the
government bans firearm possession, but C (who really is a C) decides
to carry a weapon nonetheless. If C uses the firearm in justifiable
self-defense, should C have a necessity defense to a charge of illegal
possession? C might say that any basis for thinking she was really an
A is removed by the facts of her case. However, to give C such a
defense would rob the general prohibition of most of its deterrent
effect. Many A's, thinking themselves C's, will reason that they can
safely violate the possession prohibition because their violation would
196. Cf SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION AND THE
HEALTHY MIND 10-11 (1990) (reporting that ninety percent of people surveyed rated
themselves as above average drivers); Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal
Risks, 246 SCI. 1232 (1989) (reporting similarly optimistic assessment of personal risks).
197. I do not contend that any of these claims is true-only that they are sufficiently
uncertain that lawmakers may take them to be true.
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likely only come to light in the event that they use the firearm, and
because they (erroneously) believe they would only use the firearm
justifiably, they reason that they could not be prosecuted. Thus, if we
conclude that the difficulty of distinguishing A's from C's ex ante
justifies prohibiting firearm possession even by C's, we would likely
also conclude that that in order to be able to enforce the prohibition,
we must disallow a necessity defense by C.198
This result may seem somewhat harsh, and I admit that I am not
entirely comfortable with it. We justified a reduction in B's safety on
the ground that B was endangering third parties. C, by contrast, does
not endanger third parties. How can the harmful effects of A's
conduct justify a limit on C's ability to protect herself from attack?
There is no good answer to this question other than to say that
sometimes the good of the community justifies imposing general
burdens that are irreducibly imprecise.
Even if we find this response unconvincing, it is worth pausing to
notice that the normative arguments we have considered for some
limited right of armed self-defense do not track the Second
Amendment at all closely. There is the initial problem of grafting a
self-defense justification onto a text that speaks in what appear now,
and were understood at the founding, to be military terms. In
addition, a right to own or possess firearms is at most an indirect
means of protecting the right of personal security. If the latter can be
protected as or nearly as effectively by other means-such as police
protection or nonlethal weapons-the argument for a right to
firearms is accordingly weaker.
Finally, there is the problem that the self-defense argument
hardly justifies a right to own or possess firearms for all of "the
people." At most, the arguments considered justify exemptions from
general prohibitions for some particular individuals in particular
circumstances.199 The question of who, if anyone, should be entitled
to a right to own, possess, or use firearms, and under what
circumstances, raises difficult issues of substantive criminal law. To
the extent that these are also issues of constitutional law, they are
198. However, we should still allow A to plead self-defense to the substantive crime with
which she might be charged. Even if A committed a malum prohibitum by obtaining the firearm
in the first place, once she was under attack she was entitled to use reasonable force to defend
herself. Cf GEORGE FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE (1988).
199. But cf United States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 770, 774 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kozinski, J.,




probably better analyzed under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments than by attempting to shoehorn them
into the Second Amendment.200
VI. IS THE SECOND AMENDMENT AN ANACHRONISM?
A recent article by Stephen Halbrook and David Kopel accuses
critics of the individual right interpretation of adopting a "'nihilist
theory' of the Second Amendment." 201 The Amendment must do
something, they say; otherwise there was no need to bother adding it.
To the extent that Halbrook and Kopel issue a historical challenge,
we have a plausible answer: the framers and ratifiers of the Second
Amendment were principally worried about a standing federal army.
By protecting state militias against abolition they hoped to reduce
federal reliance on a standing army and, in the event of federal
tyranny by a standing army, to provide the states with the means to
resist.202 This response may seem less than fully satisfactory because
we do not share the founders' distrust of standing armies or their faith
in militias. Our national defense now rests almost entirely with
federal forces and, after the Civil War, the notion of an armed clash
between the federal government and some number of states is
understood not as our last defense against tyranny but as the
paradigmatic national catastrophe. Thus, the something that the
Second Amendment accomplished at the founding looks now like a
nothing. To avoid rendering the Second Amendment a modern
nullity, the Halbrook/Kopel argument implies, we should adopt the
individual right interpretation -even if that is ahistorical.
However, it is decidedly not true that preserving state militias
against federal abolition serves no modern purpose. To be sure,
200. This is not to say that the Court is likely to use any of these provisions to infer a
personal right of armed self defense given what Laurence Tribe aptly calls its "normative double
standard." Laurence H. Tribe, Comment: Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or
Immunities Revival Portend the Future-Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L.
REv. 110, 158 (1999).
The Court allows rights that help fill out the constitutional landscape [of federal-state
relations] to be derived by structural inference from the borders and lines of authority
that map that landscape. However, it paradoxically proceeds as though rights that are
valued in themselves as constitutive elements of the human personality in a non-
totalitarian regime may not be similarly derived; rather, these individual rights must be
located, if at all, only in specific text or tradition.
Id.
201. Halbrook & Kopel, supra note 125, at 351.
202. Cf SPITZER, supra note 32, at 27 (stating that the Second Amendment's original "aim
was to ensure the continued existence of state militias as a military and political counterbalance
to the national army, and more broadly to national power").
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giving full effect to the spirit of the Second Amendment would
potentially require overruling the Selective Draft Law Cases,203 which
upheld Congress's authority to incorporate National Guard and
National Guard Reserve troops into the regular army. But those
cases are fully consistent with the letter of the Second Amendment as
I have explained it: relying on the militia clauses but not the Second
Amendment, the Court said that even though Congress might choose
to incorporate militia members into the national army, its power to
train and discipline the militia would, in general, obviate "the
necessity for exercising the army power.2 °1 4 The Second Amendment
still reinforces this idea, just as the Tenth Amendment reinforces the
notion of enumerated powers of Article I.
This last suggestion also provides a response to the charge that
interpreting the Second Amendment merely to preserve state militias
renders it redundant with the militia provisions of Articles I and II.
The response is: so what? There is in fact no interpretive canon
requiring that every constitutional provision have some effect not
attributable to some other provision. For example, under the
Supreme Court's modern interpretation of the Commerce Clause,
Congress may regulate intra-state economic activity that has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. 205 Under that test, many of
the powers articulated elsewhere in Article I are unnecessary.
Among the provisions rendered surplusage by the modern
interpretation of the Commerce Clause are the power: "To
establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies";206 "[t]o
Coin Money";207 "[t]o provide for the Punishment of counter-
feiting"; 2 8 and to issue copyrights and patents. 209 It was just this
redundancy that led Justice Thomas, concurring in United States v.
Lopez, 210 to complain that the Court's interpretation of the
Commerce Clause warranted reexamination.211 None of his col-
leagues took the offer seriously. Thus, on the question that was most
203. 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
204. Id. at 383.
205. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (invalidating the Gun Free School
Zones Act in part because firearm possession is not "economic activity," while reaffirming
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
207. Id. cl. 5.
208. Id. cl. 6.
209. See id. cl. 8.
210. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
211. See id. at 587 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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central to the debate over ratification of the Constitution-the scope
of Congress's enumerated powers-we find that whole clauses have
been rendered superfluous by the modern understanding.
There are additional examples of constitutional provisions that
have been rendered superfluous by expansive interpretation of other
provisions or changed circumstances. Congress's power to "grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal"2l2 was rendered useless by the 1856
Declaration of Paris (even if in principle the United States could
renounce the Declaration). 213  The limitation of the Seventh
Amendment's guarantee of a civil jury trial right to cases in which the
amount in controversy exceeds "twenty dollars" has been entirely
eaten away by inflation.214 And given the Supreme Court's ruling that
the Free Exercise Clause prohibits discriminatory but not
nondiscriminatory burdens on religion, 25 it is not clear that the Free
Exercise Clause adds anything to the Establishment Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause (or in the case of the federal government,
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause) .216
Even if we disagree with the particulars of any of these
developments-perhaps we think the Seventh Amendment has
earned a cost of living adjustment-the more general phenomenon
makes perfect sense. The Constitution is not the work of an
omniscient deity who foresaw all future developments and chose only
those words that were indispensable for all circumstances. 217
212. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
213. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 814 (5th ed. 1979).
214. It might be objected that the erosion of the twenty-dollar limit has worked an
expansion of the Seventh Amendment, while the erosion of the Second Amendment (if that is
what has occurred) worked a contraction of rights. However, other doctrinal changes have
eroded the Seventh Amendment itself. The most prominent is the acceptance in modern times
of means for taking cases away from the jury that were not available in 1791. See Galloway v.
United States, 319 U.S. 372, 405-7 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) (disapproving the erosion of the
civil jury's prerogative). In any event, my next example also involves the erosion of a right, and
the expansion of the Commerce Clause worked an erosion of a limitation on government,
which, for some purposes, is the equivalent of the erosion of a right.
215. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
216. For a theory of the Free Exercise Clause that may give it some independent bite
notwithstanding Smith, see Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994); Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for
Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994).
217. Christopher Eisgruber aptly describes the "aesthetic fallacy." See Christopher L.
Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and Constitutional Justice, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1611, 1617 (1997). "People in the grip of this fallacy suppose that the Constitution is like a
poem, a symphony, or a great work of political philosophy. Each word and every phrase must
come together to form a harmonious and pleasing composition." Id.
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Furthermore, because it is phrased in general language and so very
difficult to amend, its interpretation calls for some degree of
flexibility.2 8 It should hardly surprise us that over the course of more
than two centuries, some provisions of the Constitution faded in
importance or were rendered redundant by the sensible expansive
interpretation of others. Certainly the Second Amendment's fate has
hardly been unique in this respect.
In my view, there remains one minor difficulty with interpreting
the Second Amendment solely to preserve state militias: even if we
reject the view that the "militia" is now synonymous with "the
people," and even if "the people" as understood in the late eighteenth
century were understood as not exactly collective or individual in the
way we use those terms today, the individual right scholars who argue
that the term "the people" now generally means individuals make a
legitimate point. Perhaps we should try to understand the Second
Amendment as preserving some individual right. However, engaging
in this exercise in creative anachronism hardly compels the individual
right to own and possess firearms.
One possibility we considered in the previous Part would be to
recognize a limited right of armed self-defense. I noted above the
awkward fit between the scope of the right that might be justified and
the Second Amendment's reference to all of "the people." We might
remedy that problem by emphasizing the militia's original role as a
primitive police force: perhaps the right that inheres in all of the
people is, contrary to the thrust of DeShaney v. Winnebago County,219
a right to adequate police protection. The issue is hardly
hypothetical. Minority communities have long complained that the
police provide them with inadequate protection. 220 Of course, a right
of self-help against private violence would not address the related
problem of abusive treatment of racial minorities by the police
themselves. Borrowing a page from the broad notion of "self-
defense" favored by the Black Panther Party, one might think that
the solution to this problem is also private arms, but this view sounds
218. The argument is borrowed, of course, from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
219. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
220. Even if, for institutional competence reasons, such a positive right could not be fully
enforced by the judiciary, see Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978); Lawrence G. Sager,
Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
410, 419 (1993), its denial might serve as the predicate for some forms of self-help-although
this too would call for difficult judicial assessments of when police protection was so inadequate
to justify self-help.
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dangerously similar to a private right of insurrection; reforms of
police practices would seem a much more appropriate course." l
A second possibility would be to recognize a right of law-abiding
citizens, upon successful completion of a safety course, to own or
possess a small number of long-barreled guns.222 As Wills notes,
pistols were virtually unknown at the founding, except for dueling by
aristocrats.2 23 Merging narrowly understood history with the narrow
letter of Miller, we might say that the Second Amendment protects a
right to guns similar to those that were deemed useful to the militia at
the founding.
A long-guns-only interpretation would have two pragmatic
virtues as well. First, it would not threaten hunters, an important
political constituency. Second, a distinction between long guns and
handguns may make policy sense. Although handguns comprise
roughly one-third of all firearms in the United States, they account
for over three-fourths of firearm homicides, and more than half of all
homicides.22 4 An effective ban on handguns would undoubtedly shift
some gun violence from handguns to other weapons, but some
substantial reduction in total violence would probably result.
Both of the foregoing proposals-a limited right of self-defense
and a limited right to own or possess long guns-lack any direct
connection to the military focus of the Second Amendment. My final
proposal would address that deficiency. Even if we do not share the
founders' skepticism of standing armies, we may well sympathize with
the ideal of the citizen-soldier in the following sense: we are rightly
concerned by large gaps between martial and civilian values.
Nuremberg and My Lai teach that, notwithstanding the importance of
military discipline, the duty to follow orders does not excuse members
of the armed services of their duty to follow minimal rules of human
decency. The Iran Contra affair provides a warning about how ready
military officials may be to execute policy contrary to law if they are
convinced that the civil authorities will turn a blind eye. The ideal of
221. See generally Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997).
222. Cf Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to
Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 123 (1987) (distinguishing handguns from long guns
based on their utility in fighting a standing army).
223. See WILLS, supra note 90, at 30-31.
224. The ratio of handguns to total guns was reported in 1991. See How Many Guns?, ATF
NEWS RELEASE FY-91-36. The homicide numbers have been consistent from 1990 through
1997 (the most recent year available), except that in 1990 handguns accounted for slightly less
than half of all homicides. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide Trends in the United States
(visited Jan. 9, 2000) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/weapons.txt>.
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a citizen-soldier in the sense of a service member who is both of the
people and subject to civilian control is thus very much a modern
ideal.
And how does the Second Amendment speak to this ideal in
modern times? By providing a right of the people to keep and bear
arms-that is, a right to serve in the military. Of course the
government need not accept anyone who wishes to serve in the
military. Exclusions based on physical fitness, military need, criminal
record, and so forth, would be perfectly appropriate. But wholesale
exclusions based on stereotypical assumptions would not be
consistent with the ideal of armed forces drawn from "the people."
On this reading, the most substantial effect of the Second
Amendment today would be to invalidate official military
discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual orientation.225
This proposal is not nearly as odd as it at first appears. Its great
virtue is its synthesis of the founding and Reconstruction as those
periods are now understood. Recall Amar's contention that the
Second Amendment means today what it meant circa 1868.226 His
approach depends not only on saddling us with Reconstruction-era
views about arms-bearing, but also relies on the old distinction
between civil and political rights, which Amar aptly characterizes as
dividing people into "First Class Citizens" and "members of the
larger society. '227 However, even if those who framed and ratified the
Reconstruction Amendments still thought in these terms, in our times
the central meaning of those amendments is that there can be no
division of citizens into classes.228 The idea that "[t]here is no caste
here" 2 9 has become a fixed star in our constitutional constellation. 230
Understanding the core meaning of the Reconstruction
Amendments in these terms also explains how the Second
225. See Balkin, supra note 60, at 1718-19; Carl Riehl, Uncle Sam Has to Want You: The
Right of Gay Men and Lesbians (and All Other Americans) to Bear Arms in the Military, 26
RUTGERS L.J. 343 (1995).
226. Note that Amar also proposes reading the Second Amendment to constrain sex and
sexual orientation discrimination in the military. See Amar, supra note 161, at 26-27. Like me,
Amar puts forward this proposal hesitantly, although while I offer it as a possible alternative to
an individual right to armed self-defense, Amar appears to offer it as a supplement to such a
right. See id. at 27.
227. AMAR, supra note 65, at 48.
228. I say citizens and not people because we do permit restrictions on voting and jury
service by noncitizens.
229. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
230. How to interpret the anticaste principle remains controversial in some contexts, of




Amendment could be read to speak to the composition of federal
forces and not just state militias. It is not just that the operative
clause makes no reference to state as opposed to federal forces. The
anticaste principle has become so central to our modern
understanding of the entire Constitution that it infuses the whole.23t
To be sure, none of these alternative readings is clearly superior
to viewing the Second Amendment as simply a limit on Congress's
ability to abolish state militias. The alternatives are offered for those
who believe-quite erroneously in my view-that every constitutional
provision must play a substantial role in shaping the proper scope of
government authority. As the last of my proposals shows, however,
we should not assume that giving the Second Amendment bite
necessarily means giving civilians guns.
CONCLUSION
This Article has proceeded on the assumption that something
important is at stake in the academic debate over how to interpret the
Second Amendment. Yet most "contemporary gun control pro-
posals, which by and large do not seek to ban all firearms, but seek
only to prohibit a narrow type of weaponry (such as assault rifles) or
to regulate gun ownership by means of waiting periods, registration,
mandatory safety devices, or the like.., are plainly constitutional," 23 2
even under the individual right view of the Second Amendment. An
originalist could find the justification for the contemporary proposals
in analogous provisions in force during colonial times and at the time
of the founding.233 A doctrinalist would note that recognition of a
constitutional right-whether to free speech or to the possession of
firearms-can be limited if the limitation is necessary to further a
compelling government interest such as public safety.23 4
Nevertheless, the debate over the scope of the Second
Amendment is not merely an academic one. Even if modest gun
control proposals are consistent with the individual right view of the
231. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (opening the opinion by noting that
"[olne century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the Constitution neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens") (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
232. See TRIBE, supra note 1, at 902.
233. See id. at 903.
234. See Laurence H. Tribe & Akhil Reed Amar, Well-Regulated Militias, and More, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, at A31 (stating that because "[ailmost no right known to the Constitution
is absolute and unlimited-not even the rights of free speech and religious exercise ... [tihe
right to bear arms is certainly subject to reasonable regulation in the interest of public safety.").
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Second Amendment, at some point, federal, state, or local lawmakers
may conclude that a complete or near-complete ban on private
possession of handguns is needed to reduce the level of violent crime
in the United States to that of other industrialized nations. Such an
immodest measure would be well-nigh impossible to justify if one
accepted the conventional individual right view.
To be sure, the doctrinal solution would remain technically
available: we could say that there is an individual right to possess
firearms, but it must yield to the compelling interest in preventing
violent crime. Yet if a compelling interest overrides a right in nearly
every circumstance in which the right may be exercised, one might as
well say that there is no right. One of the main arguments against
finding in the Second Amendment an individual right to firearm
possession is that such a right would endanger public safety. If a
court were to find that, notwithstanding the threat to public safety,
the Second Amendment protects an individual right to firearm
possession, it is highly unlikely that the same court would go on to
find a compelling interest that would justify strong gun control
measures. Thus, it makes a great deal of practical difference whether
or not the advocates of the individual right view prevail in the courts.
Should they so prevail? This Article has argued that, judged by
the conventional criteria of constitutional adjudication, the case for a
robust individual right to own firearms enforceable against either the
federal or state governments has not been made. To be sure, this is
not to say that the conventional criteria are correct. Critics of the
Supreme Court abound. The most common criticism points to the
"countermajoritarian difficulty, ' '23 objecting to the Court's power to
nullify democratically chosen policies. Of course, that is not the
complaint of the advocates of the individual right interpretation of
the Second Amendment. In their view, the courts have been
insufficiently countermajoritarian.
What infuriates the individual right scholars who oppose gun
control-and embarrasses those who favor it-is their perception of a
political double-standard. Even if we grant that the Second Amend-
ment's text does not unambiguously guarantee an individual right of
firearm ownership and possession, they say, surely there is greater
textual support for such a right than for other rights the Court has
235. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).
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recognized, such as the right to contraception, 23 6 the right to
abortion,237 or the right of minor first cousins to live together with
their grandmother.238
Note the understanding of constitutional interpretation implied
by this criticism: surrounding the core of each textual provision are
concentric circles of related values; if a right is recognized at some
distance from the core, then a fortiori, all rights at lesser distances
must be recognized as well. Thus, if contraception lies a distance X
from the Fourth Amendment (and other provisions), recognition of a
constitutional right to contraception implies recognition of a right of
armed self-defense, provided that such a right lies a distance less than
X from the Second Amendment.
Although this view of constitutional interpretation finds some
superficial support in the Court's discussion of "penumbras" and
"emanations" in Griswold v. Connecticut,239 it is deeply flawed. The
right to scream profane threats at passersby is arguably closer to the
text of the First Amendment than is the right to publish on the
Internet a statement of political support for a presidential candidate;
the former is literally "speech," while the latter neither employs vocal
chords nor a printing press. Yet no one would seriously argue that
protection of the latter implies protection of the former. To the
extent that talk of penumbras and emanations leads us to think that
constitutional interpretation in hard cases is a matter of measuring
the distance from the text, it is simply another unsuccessful effort to
banish value judgments from constitutional interpretation.24°
The existence of a large body of Supreme Court decisions
recognizing constitutional rights that are not expressly articulated in
236. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
237. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
238. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
239. 381 U.S. at 484 (1965).
240. See DWORKIN, supra note 172, at 79-80 (challenging the conventional distinction
between enumerated and unenumerated rights). Justice Stewart made a similar point about the
Griswold Court's efforts to portray its ruling in strictly textualist terms in his concurrence in Roe
v. Wade. He wrote:
Griswold understandably did its best to avoid reliance on the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment as the ground for decision. Yet, the Connecticut law did
not violate any provision of the Bill of Rights, nor any other specific provision of the
Constitution. So it was clear to me then, and it is equally clear to me now, that the
Griswold decision can be rationally understood only as a holding that the Connecticut
statute substantively invaded the "liberty" that is protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 167-68.
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the text 241 means that we cannot rule out the individual right view of
the Second Amendment on textual grounds alone. The champions of
the individual right view are entitled to have their arguments heard.
However, that does not mean that they are entitled to have their
arguments accepted, unless, as judged by the admittedly somewhat
value-laden criteria of constitutional interpretation, the arguments
are convincing. As I have endeavored to show throughout this
Article, on the whole these criteria point away from the individual
right interpretation.
241. Although this body of opinions may be large, it does not appear to be growing, as the
Court has retreated from its most expansive approach to substantive due process. It is, in effect,
out of the business of recognizing previously unrecognized rights. See, e.g., Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (stating that a substantive due process right will be
recognized only if it is deeply rooted in history and tradition as well as implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty) (citing Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
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